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INTRODUCTION
For more than three decades injured consumers have sought
recovery against cigarette companies for injuries caused by smok-
ing.' At first, consumers based their claims on theories of negli-
gence or breach of warranty.2 Tobacco companies, however, typi-
cally claimed to be unaware of the health risks of smoking, despite
medical evidence to the contrary,3 and the courts refused to find
them negligent for failing to warn about unknown risks.4 Lack of
knowledge also precluded liability in breach of warranty actions.
Strict products liability has now largely replaced negligence
and breach of warranty as a preferred theory of recovery against
products sellers.' Under this approach, codified in section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the seller of a defective prod-
uct may be held liable to injured consumers without fault.1 Strict
1. See Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1425 (1980).
2. See Ross v. Philip Morris, Inc., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d
70 (5th Cir. 1962), question certified to state court, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), rev'd, 325
F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964), rev'd, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968),
aff'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Pritchard
v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), rev'd, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1009 (1967); Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa.
1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974); Fine v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F.
Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass.
1957), afl'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958). For a discussion of
these cases, see Note, Strict Products Liability on the Move: Cigarette Manufacturers May
Soon Feel the Heat, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1137, 1143-54 (1986).
3. In fact, medical experts detected the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer
as early as the 1930's. See, e.g., Hoffman, Cancer and Smoking Habits, 93 ANNALS OF SUR-
GERY 50, 56 (1931) (increase in lung cancer directly connected to spread of cigarette smok-
ing); DeBakey & Ochsner, Primary Pulmonary Malignancy, 68 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY &
OBSTETRICS 435 (1939) (smoking is probably a factor in the development of lung cancer).
4. See, e.g., Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 482; Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 40.
5. See, e.g., Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541, 542 (5th Cir. 1970);
Ross, 328 F.2d at 12. But see Green, 154 So. 2d at 171.
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
7. See id. Section 402(A) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller
is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
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liability is applicable to three types of product defect: manufactur-
ing defects, design defects, and failure to warn.8 Each of these the-
ories of product defect is potentially applicable to cigarette injury
cases.
A manufacturing defect arises from some mishap in the pro-
duction process;' the product is considered defective because it
varies from the manufacturer's intended design.10 Tobacco compa-
nies have always been liable for manufacturing defects when, for
example, consumers are injured by foreign objects found in ciga-
rettes and other tobacco products.1
A design defect exists when the entire product line shares a
common characteristic.' 2 A product is considered defective when
risks of a particular design outweigh its utility.'3 It is difficult to
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or con-
sumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller.
Id.
8. See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 449, 479 A.2d 374, 385 (1984); Voss v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 450 N.E.2d 204, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983); Kress &
Wheeler, A Comment on Recent Developments in Judicial Imputation of Post-Manufac-
ture Knowledge in Strict Liability Cases, 6 J. PROD. LiAB. 127, 135 (1983).
9. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to War-
ranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 599 (1980); Darnell &
Placitella, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: Evolution or Revolution in Strict
Products Liability?, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 801, 803 (1983).
10. See Keeton, Product Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10
CUMB. L. REv. 293, 297 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. DeLape, 109 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1940)
(explosive material in cigarette); Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54
S.W.2d 612 (1932) (worm in chewing tobacco); Weiner v. D.A. Schulte, Inc., 275 Mass. 379,
176 N.E. 114 (1931) (nail in chewing tobacco); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loftin, 99 So.
13 (Miss. 1924) (snake in chewing tobacco); Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss.
490, 78 So. 365 (1918) (human toe in chewing tobacco); Foley v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco
Co., 136 Misc. 468, 241 N.Y.S. 233 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1930), aff'd, 232 A.D. 833, 249 N.Y.S.
924 (2d Dep't 1931) (mouse in smoking tobacco); Corum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205
N.C. 213, 171 S.E. 78 (1933) (fishhook in chewing tobacco); Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57
Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E.2d 130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936) (firecracker in cigar); Liggett & Meyers
Tobacco Co. v. Wallace, 69 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (steel particles in chewing
tobacco).
12. See Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L.
REV. 317, 345-47 (1978); Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L.
REv. 777, 782 (1983).
13. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236; Thibault v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 807, 395 A.2d 843, 846 (1978); Turner v. General Mo-
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apply conventional design defect theory to cigarettes because their
carcinogenic properties do not result from a conscious design
choice, but are inherent characteristics of the product. Neverthe-
less, litigants have sometimes argued that the health risks of ciga-
rette smoking outweigh its utility to such an extent that strict lia-
bility is justified even though no safer alternative design exists. 14
Finally, a manufacturer may be held strictly liable under a
"failure to warn" theory when it sells a product without providing
adequate warnings or instructions. 5 Injured consumers have
claimed that tobacco companies failed to provide them with suffi-
cient information about the health risks or the danger of addiction
from smoking cigarettes.16 Under this theory, cigarette manufac-
turers may be held strictly liable even though their products are
not otherwise defective.
At first blush, the failure to warn concept looks quite promis-
ing from the plaintiff's point of view. Tobacco companies placed no
warnings at all on their products until 1966, when the Federal Cig-
arette Labeling and Advertising Act 17 became effective. Even after
that time, the warnings provided were clearly inadequate under or-
dinary principles of products liability." For this reason, injured
consumers have relied heavily on the failure to warn theory in re-
cent years in suits against cigarette manufacturers."9 Tobacco com-
tors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979); see also Keeton, Products Liability and the
Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-38 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Lia-
bility for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283, 286 (D.N.J. 1986);
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191-92 (E.D. Tenn. 1985);
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. 347, 357, 523 A.2d 712, 716-17 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
15. See Schwartz, Foreward: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 435,
435-36 (1979); Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 551, 551-52 (1980).
16. See Note, Plaintiffs' Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against Cigarette Manufac-
turers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 809, 809 n.1 (1986) [hereinafter Note, (Plaintiffs' Conduct)]; Note,
Preemption of Recovery in Cigarette Litigation: Can Manufacturers Be Sued for Failure to
Warn Even Though They Have Complied with Federal Warning Requirements?, 20 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 867, 867 (1987) [hereinafter Note, (Preemption)].
17. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
18. See Note, The Great American Smokeout: Holding Cigarette Manufacturers Lia-
ble for Failing to Provide Adequate Warnings of the Hazards of Smoking, 27 B.C.L. REv.
1033, 1064 (1987).
19. See Note, supra note 2, at 1138. Anti-tobacco organizations such as the Group
Against Smoke Pollutants (GASP) and Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) have pro-
vided logistical support for many of these lawsuits. See id.
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panies have fought back, however, by arguing that products liabil-
ity actions based on failure to warn are preempted by the Act.20
The preemption doctrine determines what areas of law are the
exclusive responsibility of the federal government and what areas
are left to exclusive or concurrent state regulation.2 If the preemp-
tion doctrine is applicable in cigarette warning cases, plaintiffs
would be unable to challenge the adequacy of any warning con-
tained in cigarette labeling or promotional material.2 This would
not only bar claims based on failure to warn, but would also ex-
clude those based on fraud or breach of express warranty.23
The Act expressly prohibits states from directly regulating cig-
arette labeling or advertising;24 however, neither the Act's language
nor its legislative history indicates whether product liability ac-
tions are likewise preempted. Nevertheless, tobacco companies
have successfully argued that lawsuits based on failure to warn are
preempted because they frustrate the regulatory purposes of the
Act.2 5 Notwithstanding the weight of authority in favor of preemp-
tion, this Article takes a contrary position and contends that pre-
emption is not appropriate in cigarette warning cases.2 6
Not only is preemption unwarranted on doctrinal grounds, but
20. See Comment, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses to Ciga-
rette Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 643, 652 (1987).
21. See Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last
Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 507, 514 (1986).
22. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
23. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. 347, 355, 523 A.2d 712,
716 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (claim based on fraud and misrepresentation in adver-
tising preempted). Preemption, however, would not affect claims based on any other theory
of product defect. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986)
(claim based on risk-utility theory allowed to proceed independently of preempted failure to
warn claim); Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1191-92 (claim that product is "unreasonably danger-
ous" not preempted); Dewey, 216 N.J. Super. at 356, 523 A.2d at 716 (claim based on defec-
tive design not preempted).
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
25. See Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626; Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313
(11th Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987); Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1191; Dewey, 216 N.J. Super. at 354-
55, 523 A.2d at 716.
26. The district courts in Palmer and Cipollone rejected the preemption argument but
were reversed on appeal. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (D.
Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F.
Supp. 1146, 1170 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 907 (1987).
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public policy appears to strongly support the imposition of strict
liability upon cigarette manufacturers. This Article speculates that
some courts may have used the preemption doctrine to mask their
misgivings about the ability of tort litigation to provide fair com-
pensation to injured consumers without bankrupting the tobacco
industry. Consequently, the author suggests that it may be neces-
sary to streamline the litigation process for mass torts or perhaps
even to replace it with an alternative compensation system for the
purpose of adjudicating smoking-related claims.
With this in mind, Part I briefly examines the health risks of
smoking and the nature of the common law duty to warn. It also
reviews a number of recent cigarette preemption cases. Part II
takes a closer look at the preemption doctrine itself. The analysis
focuses on the traditional preemption categories: express preemp-
tion, occupation of the field, and actual conflict between state and
federal law.28
Part III applies these concepts to the cigarette warning contro-
versy.29 It concludes that cigarette warnings do not fall within any
of the traditional preemption categories. Part IV considers the cig-
arette warning controversy from a policy perspective and concludes
that cigarette companies should not be immunized by the preemp-
tion doctrine from their duty to compensate injured consumers.3 0
Part V concludes that cigarette warning claims, if allowed,
would place a significant burden on both plaintiffs and defend-
ants.3 1 Therefore, it considers how the present litigation process
can be streamlined to handle mass tort claims. In addition, Part V
briefly reviews an alternate compensation plan for smoking-related
injuries.32
I. THE CIGARETTE WARNING CONTROVERSY
A. The Health Consequences of Smoking
According to the Surgeon General, "cigarette smoking is the
single most important preventable environmental factor contribut-
27. See infra notes 33-113 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 114-212 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 213-307 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 308-419 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 420-78 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 479-86 and accompanying text.
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ing to illness, disability and death in the United States. '"33 Ciga-
rettes contain a variety of harmful substances. Not only does ciga-
rette smoke contain tar and nicotine, but it also includes more
than 2,000 potentially dangerous chemical compounds."' In addi-
tion, herbicides, pesticides and insecticides used in the cultivation
of tobacco remain on cigarette tobacco and eventually enter the
smoker's lungs.3 5 Furthermore, cigarette filters may contain asbes-
tos,3 6 a substance which is especially dangerous to those who
smoke. 7
According to the World Health Organization, more than a mil-
lion people die annually from the effects of smoking.38 In the
United States, the death toll from smoking now exceeds 350,000
per year.39 About 130,000 of these deaths are due to cancer, while
170,000 are caused by coronary heart disease, and another 50,000
deaths are attributable to chronic obstructive lung disease.40
Cancer was the first of these health risks to be identified and
documented. 1 In 1964, a committee appointed by the Surgeon
General, after reviewing thousands of articles and scientific stud-
ies, concluded that cigarettes caused cancer. 2 Lung cancer is per-
haps the greatest cancer risk.'3 Smoking is now thought to cause as
33. Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Smoking and
Health: Report of the Surgeon General at vii (1979) [hereinafter Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1979].
34. See Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their Ashes Be Kicked?,
29 ARiz. L. REV. 195, 216 (1987).
35. See Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1979, supra note 33, at 14-18. For example, some of the
fertilizers used by tobacco growers produce radioactive polonium-210, which enters the
smoker's lungs when cigarette smoke is inhaled. See Ponte, Radioactivity: The New-Found
Danger in Cigarettes, READER'S DIGEST, Mar. 1986, at 123, 124-25.
36. See Levin, supra note 34, at 218.
37. See Haskins, The Tobacco Industry-A Contributor to Asbestos Disabilities, 34
FED'N INS. CouNs. Q. 271, 281-84 (1984) (smokers exposed to asbestos thirty times more
likely to develop lung cancer than nonsmokers exposed to asbestos).
38. See Note, Constitutional Realism: Legislative Bans on Tobacco Advertising and
the First Amendment, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1193, 1209. According to one commentator, to-
bacco has killed more human beings than all the wars of this century. See P. TAYLOR, THE
SMoKE RING: TOBACCO, MONEY & MULTINATIONAL POLITICS 281 (1984).
39. See Brody, Recovery Against Tobacco Companies, 21 TRIAL 48, 51 (1985); Note,
supra note 18, at 1033.
40. See Comment, supra note 20, at 643 n.2.
41. See Note, Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Smoking Induced Illnesses and
Deaths, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 168 (1986).
42. See Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Smoking and
Health, Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health
Services 31 (1964) [hereinafter Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1964].
43. See id.
[Vol. 39:897
Preemption and Cigarette Warnings
much as 95% of all lung cancer.44 The cancer risks of smoking,
however, are not limited to lung cancer alone; smoking also causes
cancer of the stomach, cervix, pharynx, esophagus, bladder, pan-
creas and kidney.45 In addition, smokers have higher rates of can-
cer of the larynx and oral cavity.4"
Heart disease is another significant health consequence of
smoking.47 According to the Surgeon General, smoking contributes
to coronary heart disease, arteriosclerotic peripheral vascular dis-
ease and aortic atherosclerosis."8 Smoking is also the primary cause
of chronic obstructive lung diseases such as chronic bronchitis and
emphysema." In addition, cigarette smoking has been linked to
hearing loss, tissue hypnoxia, retinal degeneration, and early
menopause.50
Smoking poses a particular threat to the children of women
who smoke. 1 Cigarette smoking by pregnant women significantly
increases the chances of miscarriage, stillborn children, premature
birth, and children with low birth weight.5 2 Moreover, children
born to smoking mothers are more likely to suffer from impaired
reading ability and are more susceptible to bronchitis and pneumo-
nia during early childhood.5
The economic and health costs of cigarette smoking are enor-
mous. One commentator estimates that the cost of illness and
death, as measured by medical expenses and lost income, amounts
44. See Levin, supra note 34, at 199. The cancer rate for cigarette smokers is two to
four times the rate for nonsmokers. See Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ.
& Welfare, The Health Consequences of Smoking: Cancer, A Report of the Surgeon Gen-
eral at v (1982) [hereinafter Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1982].
45. See Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1979, supra note 33, at 31-53; Levin, supra note 34, at 227.
46. See Comment, Products Liability-Can It Kick the Smoking Habit?, 19 AKRON L.
REV. 269, 269-70 (1985).
47. See Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, The Health
Consequences of Smoking: Cardiovascular Disease, A Report of the Surgeon General 127-
28 (1983) [hereinafter Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1983]. The incidence of heart disease is two to
four times greater among smokers than among nonsmokers. See id.; see also Surgeon Gen.
Rpt. 1979, supra note 33, at 4-63.
48. See Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1983, supra note 47, at iv-vi.
49. See Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, The Health
Consequences of Smoking: Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease, A Report of the Surgeon
General at vii (1984) [hereinafter Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1984].
50. See Note, supra note 41, at 179-80.
51. See Note, supra note 2, at 1141.
52. See id.
53. See Levin, supra note 34, at 228.
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to $38 billion a year."' Others claim that smoking costs society as
much as $80 billion a year.5 These costs not only fall upon injured
consumers and their families, but are also borne by employers,
medical insurers and the government. 6
B. The Duty to Warn
As mentioned earlier, the doctrine of strict products liability
applies to both manufacturing defects and design defects.5 7 In ad-
dition, a manufacturer may be held strictly liable for failing to pro-
vide an adequate warning even though a product is not otherwise
defective. 8 The duty to warn is based on the notion that consum-
ers are entitled to reasonable information about the products they
buy. Because manufacturers typically know more than consumers
about the characteristics of their products, they are required to
share this information with potential buyers. Consumers who are
54. See Note, supra note 18, at 1072 (estimates lost productivity costs at $25 billion
and medical costs at $13 billion).
55. See Tribe, Anti-Cigarette Suits: Federalism with Smoke and Mirrors, THE NATION,
June 7, 1986, at 788 (economic cost of smoking estimated at $80 billion a year); Comment,
supra note 46, at 273 (estimates cost of smoking at $27 billion in productivity losses and $12
billion in additional health care costs); Comment, Judicial and Legislative Control of the
Tobacco Industry: Toward a Smoke-Free Society?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 335-36 (1987)
(estimates of annual economic cost of smoking-related disease in United States range from
$39 billion to $55 billion) [hereinafter Comment, (Judicial)].
56. See Garner, supra note 1, at 1462.
57. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. Courts and legal scholars disagree
over whether an inadequate warning is merely a form of design defect or whether it provides
an independent basis for strict products liability. Compare Britain, Product Honesty Is the
Best Policy: A Comparison of Doctors' and Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks
and the Importance of Consumer Expectations in Determining Product Defect, 79 Nw.
U.L. REV. 342, 405-07 (1984) (warning cases are usually viewed as an aspect of the general
design defect problem); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of
Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 495, 501 (1976) (if proper warning would make product unmarketable, true issue is
acceptability of basic design) (citing Note, Foreseeability In Product Design and Duty To
Warn Cases-Distinctions and Misconceptions, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 228, 234); Wade, On the
Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
734, 740 (1983) (failure to warn cases may be viewed as design defect cases) with Ger-
shonowitz, The Strict Liability Duty to Warn, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 71, 84 (1987) (poli-
cies underlying duty to design safe product and duty to warn are different); Henderson,
Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication,
73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1562-65, 1572-73 (1973) (test for "reasonable design" distinguished
from test for duty to warn); Kress & Wheeler, supra note 8, at 135 (a warning is not a
design attribute).
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properly informed can more easily avoid or reduce risk; even when
a product risk is unavoidable, a warning allows the consumer to
make an informed judgment about encountering the risk.59
For most purposes, the duty to warn is the same whether strict
liability or negligence principles are applied:60 manufacturers are
treated as experts and existing scientific knowledge is imputed to
them. 1 Furthermore, manufacturers are required to test their
products in order to discover risks.2 The duty to warn, however, is
generally limited to dangers that are within the scope of scientific
knowledge at the time the product is sold. 3
The duty to warn also reflects the fact that consumers may be
unsophisticated and poorly educated. Consequently, warnings
must be clear and understandable,6 4 they must inform the cus-
tomer about the specific nature and magnitude of the risk, 5 they
59. See Wade, supra note 58, at 745.
60. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 466-68 (7th Cir. 1984); Brochu v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 656-58 (1st Cir. 1981); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1980); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427
(2d Cir. 1969); Woodhill v. Parke-Davis, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980); Wolfgruber v.
Upjohn Co., 72 A.D.2d 59, 64, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (4th Dep't 1979); Rainbow v. Albert Elia
Bldg. Co., 49 A.D.2d 250, 253, 373 N.Y.S.2d 928, 931 (4th Dep't 1975); see also Birnbaum,
supra note 9, at 649.
61. See Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1977); Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1973); O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d
286, 291 (8th Cir. 1967); Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 468, 501 P.2d 936,
940 (1972); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 564, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1231 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979); Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 97 N.J. 429, 452, 479 A.2d 374, 396 (1984); Note,
New Jersey Advances the State of the Art in Products Liability: Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prod. Corp., 15 CONN. L. REv. 635, 675-76 (1983) [hereinafter Note, (New Jersey)];
Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reac-
tions, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 749 (1980) [hereinafter Note, (The Liability)].
62. See Banks v. Koehring Co., 538 F.2d 176, 179 (8th Cir. 1976); Dayton v. Jiffee
Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Henderson, Coping with the Time
Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALiF. L. REV. 919, 926 (1981); Merrill, Compensation
for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 38 (1973).
63. See Wade, supra note 58, at 749. However, a duty to warn arises when information
is available from which a reasonable inference might be drawn that there is a likelihood that
the product is potentially harmful. See McCue v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 453 F.2d 1033,
1035 (1st Cir. 1972); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 385, 549 P.2d 1099, 1108 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1976); Wade, supra note 58, at 749.
64. See, e.g., Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965)
(symbols must be used to warn when manufacturer knew that illiterate or uneducated per-
sons might use the product); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 475
N.E.2d 65 (1985) (reference to cerebral thrombosis not sufficient to disclose risk of stroke).
65. See, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1984)
(tampon manufacturer held liable for failing to warn about danger of toxic shock syndrome);
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must be forcefully written and prominently displayed,"6 and they
must be communicated in a way as to actually reach the con-
sumer.6 7 Furthermore, an otherwise adequate warning may be viti-
ated by overpromotion6
Measured against these criteria, existing cigarette warnings are
not sufficient to discharge the manufacturer's duty to warn. 9 To-
bacco companies provided no warning at all to consumers until the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 70 took effect in
1965. Even then, the warnings actually given were not adequate to
satisfy the cigarette manufacturer's duty to warn under principles
Torsiello v. White Hall Laboratories, 165 N.J. Super. 311, 398 A.2d 132 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1979) (failure to disclose risk of ulcers from extended use); Reid v. Eckerd Drugs,
Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 483-84, 253 S.E.2d 344, 349-50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (warning inade-
quate because it failed to disclose that deodorant could be flammable even after it was
applied).
66. See, e.g., Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 82 (4th Cir. 1962) (warning in
small print on back of furniture polish label inadequate); Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91
N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (print on warnings too small to read without
magnifying glass); Rumsey v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968) (warning on roach poison inadequate because it failed to disclose that no antidote
existed).
67. See, e.g., MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 131, 475 N.E.2d at 65 (warning to physician not
sufficient to meet duty to warn consumer).
68. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 993 (8th Cir. 1969) (warning
on Aralen inadequate because of promotion by detail men); Tinnerhorn v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969) (manufacturer
of vaccine held liable because its promotion of drug "watered down" warnings); Stevens v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 66, 507 P.2d 653, 662, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 54 (1973) (warn-
ings about dangers of Chloromycetin nullified by drug manufacturer's promotional activi-
ties); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 ll. App. 3d 540, 574, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1238 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979) (warning inadequate because promotional material only emphasized positive char-
acteristics of oral contraceptive); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 289, 282 A.2d 206, 220
(1971) (warning on Chloromycetin inadequate because of overpromotion); see also Britain,
supra note 58, at 385.
69. Failure to warn is also an attractive theory for those injured by the use of smokeless
tobacco products. These products are now known to cause cancer and other diseases. See
Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1982, supra note 44, at 203-04; Note, The Smokeless Tobacco Industry's
Failure to Warn: A Case for the Courts, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 489, 496-98 (1985). In fact, the
cancer risk associated with smokeless tobacco may be greater than the risk of cancer from
smoking cigarettes. See Note, Smokeless Tobacco: Defective Marketing Creates a New
Toxic Tort, 21 TULSA L.J. 499, 501 (1986). Nevertheless, despite mounting evidence of these
risks, smokeless tobacco products carried no warnings until 1986, when warnings were re-
quired by federal law. See Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, 15
U.S.C. § 4401 (Supp. 1987).
70. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982)).
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of strict products liability.7' More than twenty years later, ciga-
rette warnings are still inadequate.
First of all, the warnings provided on cigarette labels are not
conspicuous, 7 nor are they sufficiently forceful to be effective. Ini-
tially, the warning merely declared that cigarette smoking may be
dangerous to health.7 3 Only later was the warning strengthened to
state that the Surgeon General had determined that cigarette
smoking was dangerous to health. 4
In addition, existing warnings are not explicit enough to be
effective.7 5 Until recently, cigarette warnings made only vague ref-
erences to "health" and said nothing about lung cancer, heart dis-
ease, pulmonary disease, or any of the other specific health
problems that are clearly linked to cigarette smoking.76 Although
the federal law now requires that more specific warnings be dis-
played on cigarette packages, many serious dangers are still not
disclosed. For example, cigarette manufacturers do not inform
smokers about the addictive qualities of tobacco,78 nor do they
warn that exposure to asbestos greatly increases the risk of cancer
for smokers.79 The health consequences of passive smoking are also
ignored. 0
Furthermore, warnings have failed to inform consumers about
the likelihood or magnitude of potential injury. Prior to 1985,
warnings on cigarette labels merely cautioned that smoking could
71. See Note, supra note 18, at 1064.
72. See Levin, supra note 34, at 214.
73. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282, 283 (1965). A similar warning, which declared that a sinus medication may cause kid-
ney damage was held to be inadequate because the drug was known to cause kidney damage.
See Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 655, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). The stronger warning was required by the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982)).
75. See Note, supra note 41, at 178.
76. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982) with 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. 1987).
77. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200,
2201-03 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1987)).
78. See Garner, supra note 1, at 1434-40; Note, (Preemption), supra note 16, at 914.
According to a report by the Federal Trade Commission, more than fifty percent of adult
Americans do not realize that cigarette smoking causes both physical and psychological de-
pendency. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING
INVESTIGATION (1981).
79. See Haskins, supra note 37, at 281-84; Comment, (Judicial), supra note 55, at 319.
80. See generally Marwick, Effects of "Passive Smoking" Lead Nonsmokers to Step
Up Campaign, 253 J. A.MA 2937 (1985).
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be "harmful," and failed to mention that smoking could cause such
fatal diseases as cancer and heart disease. 1 Warning labels now
identify some specific health risks, but still fail to describe the seri-
ousness of these risks.2 They also fail to warn smokers that they
run a substantial risk of developing serious health problems if they
continue to smoke. 3
Finally, the promotional efforts of cigarette companies have
diluted the effect of health warnings. For years cigarette advertis-
ing has emphasized the youth and vigor of cigarette users, thus
suggesting that such products do not really pose a serious threat to
smokers.8 In addition, cigarette manufacturers continue to dispute
the link between smoking and disease, thereby implicitly challeng-
ing the need for warnings.8 5 Arguably, such tactics would subject
cigarette manufacturers to strict liability even if their warnings
were otherwise adequate.8
C. Recent Decisions
At this time, the weight of authority clearly favors the pre-
emption defense. One federal district court and three federal ap-
pellate courts have concluded that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act preempts products liability actions against to-
bacco companies based on failure to warn. 7 These decisions are
briefly discussed below.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.88 was the first case to con-
sider the preemptive effect of the Act. In 1983, Rose and Antonio
Cipollone filed suit against three cigarette manufacturers claiming
that Rose had developed lung cancer as a result of using the de-
fendants' products.8 9 The cigarette companies declared that any
81. See Note, supra note 41, at 181.
82. See Levin, supra note 34, at 211.
83. See id. According to one source, one out of four smokers will die prematurely. See
id. at 214 n.145.
84. See Note, supra note 38, at 1207.
85. See Note, supra note 18, at 1066-67.
86. See generally Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (lst Cir. 1987); Stephen
v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986); Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS.
L.J. 90, 96-97 (1986).
87. See infra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
88. 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
89. See Cippolone, 593 F.2d at 1146. The Cipollones contended that the defendants
produced an unsafe and defective product whose risks outweighed its utility. In addition,
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claim based on inadequate warning should be preempted by the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. The plaintiffs re-
sponded by moving to strike the preemption defense."
The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion after ruling that
their claims were not preempted.9 1 The court concluded that Con-
gress had not occupied the entire field of cigarette regulation, but
had limited itself to cigarette labeling and advertising.92 The court
regarded compensation of tort claims as distinct from labeling reg-
ulation and felt that federal occupation of one field should not re-
sult in the occupation of a different one in the absence of congres-
sional intent.9 3
On appeal, the circuit court reversed. 4 The court found that
product liability claims based on failure to warn would conflict
with the Act. According to the court, the Act represented a care-
fully drawn balance between the interests of public health and the
economic welfare of the tobacco industry. Tort liability would
pressure cigarette manufacturers into providing warnings beyond
those required by the Act, and thereby upset this statutory bal-
ance. " Therefore, the court held that the Act impliedly preempted
suits that challenged the adequacy of cigarette package labeling.96
they argued that the defendants had failed to warn consumers about the hazards of smoking
and had advertised in such a way as to neutralize the effectiveness of the warnings that were
actually given. Finally, the Cipollones alleged that the defendants' warnings were ineffective
because of the addictive qualities of cigarettes. See id. at 1149.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1171.
92. See id. at 1164.
93. See id. The court cited the following cases for this proposition: Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (Price-Anderson Act does not preempt state tort
actions); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983) (Atomic Energy Act does not preempt state utility rate
regulation); Sears-Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180, 194-97 (1978) (National Labor Relations Act does not preempt state from hearing some
labor relation cases); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 336
(1973) (federal water pollution control statute does not preempt state common law claims
for oil spill damage); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445
(1960) (city ordinance not preempted by federal shipping regulations).
94. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (1986).
95. See id. at 187. After ruling favorably on the defendants' interlocutory appeal, the
circuit remanded the case back to the district for trial. On June 13, 1988, the jury awarded
$400,000 in damages to Antonio Cipollone for personal injuries resulting from the death of
his wife, Rose. Liability was based on breach of express warranty rather than failure to
warn. The jury awarded no damages to the estate of Rose Cipollone. See 16 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) 845 (Aug. 24, 1988).
96. See id.
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Cigarette companies raised a preemption defense again in
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.9 7 The plaintiff in Roysdon
brought suit against R.J. Reynolds, claiming that that the defend-
ant failed to warn about the dangers of smoking.98 The trial court
dismissed this claim, holding that it was impliedly preempted by
the Act.99 The court found that the Act sought to achieve uniform
labeling for cigarette products by prohibiting any form of state reg-
ulation. 100 Exposing cigarette manufacturers to tort liability would
coerce them into providing warnings that are more stringent than
those required by the Act. According to the court, this would en-
able the states to regulate cigarette labeling despite the statutory
prohibition.10 1
The preemption defense also prevailed in Palmer v. Liggett
Group, Inc.02 The plaintiff in that case alleged that the defend-
ants' failure to warn proximately caused her husband's death from
lung cancer. 03 The defendants moved to dismiss all claims based
on failure to warn, arguing that such claims were preempted by the
Act.
The trial court found that damage awards would not conflict
with the purposes of the Act and cited numerous instances where
federal regulations coexisted with state tort doctrines. 1°0 Further-
more, the court felt that Congress would have expressly prohibited
damage suits based on failure to warn if it felt that they would
frustrate the Act's regulatory goals. 0 Thus, the court held that
the Act did not preempt state damage claims and denied the de-
97. 623 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Tenn. 1985).
98. See Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1190.
99. See id. at 1191.
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
101. See Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1191.
102. 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986).
103. See Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1172. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant
violated the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982), by introduc-
ing misbranded cigarettes into commerce. This claim was subsequently dismissed. See
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 392, 397-98 (D. Mass. 1984).
104. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1539-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1985); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d
653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1086 (D.C.
1976); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 140, 475 N.E.2d 65, 74
(1985); Blasing v. P.R.L. Hardenbergh Co., 303 Minn. 41, 49, 226 N.W.2d 110, 115 (1975);
Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 56, 41 A.2d 850, 853 (1945).
105. See Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1179.
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fendants' motion to dismiss.10 6
Nevertheless, the circuit court on appeal concluded that the
Act impliedly preempted the plaintiff's failure to warn claim. 1 °7
The court declared that the gist of the preemption doctrine was
whether Congress meant to displace state law when enacting fed-
eral legislation. 10 8 The court determined that Congress had two
concerns in mind when it passed the Act: protection of consumers
through education, and protection of the tobacco industry by limit-
ing the scope of state regulation. According to the court, however,
there was but one purpose-to strike a fair, effective balance be-
tween these two competing interests. 10 9 The court concluded that
products liability suits would upset the balance achieved by Con-
gress in the Act, and therefore ruled that the plaintiffs' claim was
preempted.110
Stephen v. American Brands, Inc."' was the last case to con-
sider the preemption issue. In Stephen, the plaintiff brought suit
against a tobacco company for the death of her husband. The
plaintiff claimed that the cigarette manufacturer had failed to pro-
vide an adequate warning. The company asserted a preemption de-
fense which the plaintiff moved to strike from its answer. The trial
court concluded, however, that some of the plaintiff's claims might
be preempted and denied the plaintiff's motion." 2 On appeal, the
circuit court, relying heavily on Cipollone, agreed that the Act
might preempt some of the plaintiff's claims and upheld the lower
court's decision." 3
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PREEMPTION
The preemption doctrine is a reflection of the fact that Con-
gress may pass legislation which nullifies inconsistent state stat-
utes." 4 The constitutional source of this federal preemptive power
106. See id. at 1180.
107. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987). The court agreed
with the lower court that the Act did not expressly preempt product liability actions. See id.
at 625.
108. See id. at 626.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 629.
111. 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987).
112. See Stephen, 825 F.2d at 313.
113. See id.
114. See Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152
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is the Supremacy Clause115 which provides that the laws of the
United States shall be the supreme law of the land."' State com-
mon law doctrines may be preempted in the same manner as stat-
utes when they conflict with federal law." 7 Furthermore, a federal
agency, acting within the scope of its delegated authority, may also
preempt state law." 8
Although the potential scope of the preemption doctrine is
very broad, courts are reluctant to invalidate state law unless Con-
gress clearly intended to exercise its preemptive power." 9 Conse-
quently, the courts have applied a presumption against federal
preemption of state law. 20 The presumption against preemption is
especially strong when state common law doctrines are involved
because they often represent many generations of judicial develop-
ment and concern areas that have traditionally been subject to ex-
clusive state control.12 1
Courts and commentators often distinguish between express
and implied preemption. The conventional approach is to further
divide implied preemption into occupation of the field and actual
(1982); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824).
115. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
116. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986); Hirsch, To-
ward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 515; Note, NLRA Preemp-
tion of State and Local Plant Relocation Laws, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 407, 414 (1986).
117. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582-84 (1981) (Natural Gas
Act preempts calculation of damages under state contracts doctrine); Chicago & North
Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317-32 (1981) (Interstate Com-
merce Act preempts state tort claim based on abandonment of service); Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 270-73 (1974)
(National Labor Relations Act preempts some libel claims under state law); Sperry v. Flor-
ida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247
(1959).
118. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663, 667-68 (1962) (treasury regulations); Public Util. Comm'n of Cal. v. United States, 355
U.S. 534, 544-45 (1958) (procurement regulations); Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S.
187, 188 (1956) (procurement regulations); see also Foote, Administrative Preemption: An
Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REv. 1429, 1437 (1984).
119. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
120. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981).
121. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 144 (1963).
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conflict categories.122 As Mr. Justice Black observed in Hines v.
Davidowitz,123 this classification scheme is not always applied con-
sistently: "[n]one of these expressions provides an infallible consti-
tutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final
analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked
formula.' 24 These concepts, however, provide a useful analytical
framework and, therefore, will be used in this discussion of the
preemption doctrine.
A. Express Preemption
Congress may expressly preempt state law. 2 5 Express preemp-
tion occurs when a federal statute specifically excludes state regu-
lation in a particular area. 26 For example, in Rice v. Santa Fe Ele-
vator Corp.,27 the United States Supreme Court held that
preemptive language in the federal Warehouse Act 2 ' completely
displaced state jurisdiction over federally licensed warehouse oper-
ators. 2  Consequently, the Court invalidated proceedings against a
licensee by a state regulatory commission for violating state laws
against rate discrimination and other marketing practices. 30
The Court reached a similar result in Jones v. Rath Packing
Co.' 3' In that case, a packing company brought suit to enjoin en-
forcement of a state statute which conflicted with the Wholesome
122. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986); Note, The
Burger Court and Preemption Doctrine: Federalism in the Balance, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
Rv, 1233, 1234 (1985). Another approach is to divide preemption into express, implied, and
conflict categories. See Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 203-04. Under this classification
scheme implied preemption is equivalent to occupation of the field. See id.
123. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
124. See Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67.
125. See Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 203; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525 (1977). Examples of express preemption include the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §
301(a) (1982) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §
1144(a), (c)(1) (1982).
126. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 190; Jones, 430 U.S. at 525 (package
weight standards); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (literacy tests); Rail-
way Employes' Dep't, Am. Fed. of Labor v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (union security
agreements); Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 548 F.2d 1088, 1091 (2d Cir. 1977) (munici-
pal air quality standards).
127. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
128. Ch. 313, 39 Stat. 486 (1916) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-273 (1982)).
129. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 233-34.
130. See id. at 235-36.
131. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
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Meat Act.1"2 Another federal statute, the Meat Inspection Act 3 s
prohibited marketing, labeling, packaging, or ingredient require-
ments beyond those required by the Wholesome Meat Act. The
Court determined that this provision expressly preempted incon-
sistent state labeling requirements.' The Wholesome Meat Act
allowed reasonable variations between the actual weight and the
weight stated on the package label, but the California statute made
no provision for moisture loss during distribution.' 5 Because the
state statute was not consistent with the standards of the federal
statute, the Court held that it was preempted. 3 6
Express preemption is not limited to federal statutes; federal
agencies, acting within the scope of their congressionally delegated
authority, may also expressly preempt state law. Thus, the Court
in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De La Cuesta" 7
held that regulations adopted by the Federal Loan Bank Board
preempted state law.' The Board's regulations authorized federal
savings and loan associations to place "due-on-sale" clauses in
their home mortgage contracts. 3 9 In California, this practice con-
flicted with a common law rule, known as the Wellenkamp doc-
trine, which limited the use of due-on-sale provisions. °
The Court observed that the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933
(HOLA)' 4 1 gave the Board broad authority to regulate federal sav-
ings and loan associations and found the regulations to be within
the scope of the Board's powers. 4 2 Because the Board clearly indi-
cated its intent to displace state law with respect to due-on-sale
132. See Jones, 430 U.S. at 519; 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1982). The district court ruled in
favor of the packing company. Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 357 F. Supp. 529, 531 (D. Cal.
1973), aff'd, 530 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1975).
133. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (1982).
134. See Jones, 430 U.S. at 530-31.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 531-32.
137. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
138. See Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 141.
139. 44 Fed. Reg. 39108, 39149 (1979) (later codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1980)).
140. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379 (1978). The California Supreme Court in Wellenkamp held that due-on-sale clauses
constituted an unreasonable restraint upon alienation unless the lender could show that
such a clause was necessary to protect against impairment of its security interest or the risk
of default. See id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
141. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(1) (1982).
142. See Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 159-67.
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clauses, 4" the Court reversed a state appellate court decision14 4
and held that the Board's regulation preempted the Wellenkamp
doctrine. 45
B. Federal Occupation of the Field
Federal and state regulation coexist in many areas. For exam-
ple, Congress and the states have both regulated in such fields as
banking, 4" advertising, 47 debtor-creditor relations, 48 labor rela-
tions, 4 9 and unfair trade law.150 Even when the federal government
plays a dominant role in an area, the states are still able to exercise
residuary control.1 51 However, federal involvement in an area may
be so pervasive as to preclude state regulation in the same field. 2
This result is most likely to occur in areas which are subject to
supervision by federal administrative agencies through licensing,
adjudication or comprehensive regulation. 53
143. See id. at 158.
144. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 331,
175 Cal. Rptr. 467, 468 (1981).
145. See Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 170.
146. See Bank Holding Company Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat.
1760 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982)); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 674(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1988) (concurrent state and federal restrictions on the actions of banks).
147. See Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1982)); Consumer Protection From Deceptive Practices
Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349-50 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (concurrent state and federal
laws prohibiting false advertising).
148. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982)); New York Fair Credit Reporting Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 380
(McKinney 1984) (state and federal laws requiring access to credit records by consumers).
149. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1062 (1938) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982)); Minimum Wage Act, N.Y. LABOR LAW § 652 (McKinney Supp.
1979) (state and federal laws requiring standards for minimum wages).
150. See Agricultural Products Producers Associations Act, ch. 57, § 2, 42 Stat. 388,
388-89 (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1982)); N.Y. AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAW, §
258-m (McKinney Supp. 1988) (state and federal laws forbidding unfair trade practices in
agricultural markets).
151. See Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 155 (1942) (dictum).
152. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
153. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Railway & Motor Coach Employees of
Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 296 (1971) (pervasive federal regulation of labor relations
precludes state wrongful discharge suit based on enforcement of union security clause in
labor contract); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959) (claim
for damages under state law against union for unfair labor practices interferes with NLRB
jurisdiction over labor relations); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957)
(state agency had no authority to hear unfair labor practice claim within exclusive jurisdic-
tion of NLRB); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1926) (federal
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Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc.15 4 provides an example of
the effect of pervasive federal regulation on state authority. In
Castle, state officials sought to ban a federally licensed motor car-
rier from using its highways because the carrier had repeatedly vio-
lated state vehicle weight limitations. 155 The Court observed Con-
gress had adopted a comprehensive plan for regulating interstate
motor carriers when it adopted the Federal Motor Carrier Act. 156
This federal regulatory scheme gave the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) the exclusive right to determine which motor
carriers could operate in interstate commerce."' Consequently, the
states were left with no power to deny the use of their highways to
interstate motor carriers licensed by the ICC. 5 8
The dominant nature of a federal interest may also justify fed-
eral occupation of a field.' 9 Thus, the Court in Hines v. Davido-
witz6o invalidated a state alien registration law because it con-
cluded that state restrictions on aliens were inconsistent with the
federal government's constitutional responsibility for the conduct
of foreign affairs.' 6'
Finally, the need to establish uniform standards throughout
the nation often prompts Congress to occupy a particular field.'
railroad safety statute occupied the field and thereby foreclosed parallel regulation by
state); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919) (ICC railroad
safety regulations occupied field to the exclusion of states); Southern Ry. v. Railroad
Comm'n of Ind., 236 U.S. 439, 447 (1915) (federal railroad safety statute occupied field and
thereby prevented liability for violation of state safety statute).
154. 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
155. See Castle, 348 U.S. at 62.
156. Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1982)).
157. See Castle, 348 U.S. at 63.
158. See id. at 63-64.
159. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1971) (state welfare eligibil-
ity requirements that discriminate against aliens interfere with federal power over entry of
aliens); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968) (state law cannot bar probate
awards to citizens of communist countries); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 198 (1961)
(state law cannot disinherit citizens of foreign countries); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497, 504-05 (1956) (state sedition law invades national security responsibilities of federal
government).
160. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
161. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 62.
162. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163 (1978) (federal statute
which established uniform design and construction standards for tankers preempted more
stringent state design requirements); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S.
566, 569 (1919) (ICC imposed uniform safety requirements for railroad cars); New York
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) (federal statute created uniform system of
remedies for injuries to railroad workers engaged in interstate commerce).
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For example, in Campbell v. Hussey,' the Court invalidated a
Georgia statute which attempted to identify certain tobacco by ge-
ographical origin. The Court declared that Congress mandated the
adoption of uniform standards of grading and identification for to-
bacco to serve as a guide for farmers to market their tobacco.""
This federal program left no room for supplementary state regula-
tion based on a different classification scheme. 65
The courts are not as likely to give preemptive effect to less
comprehensive federal regulatory schemes, however, where the ex-
clusion of state regulation would produce a regulatory vacuum.'66
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Commission67 pro-
vides a good illustration of this "anti-vacuum" principle. In that
case, the Court upheld a statute that conditioned the construction
of nuclear power plants on a finding by a state agency that ade-
quate storage facilities and disposal methods were available for nu-
clear waste."6 8 The Court acknowledged that the Atomic Energy
Act 69 gave the Nuclear Regulatory Commission exclusive jurisdic-
tion over nuclear safety, 70 but found that it did not prohibit the
states from dealing with economic and other non-safety issues."'
In the Court's opinion, the state statute did not infringe upon the
occupied field of nuclear safety.12
C. Actual Conflict Between State and Federal Law
Federal statutes or regulations will also override state law if
the two conflict with one another.13 For example, state law may
require a person to do something which federal law forbids. In such
cases, state law must yield to federal law. 7 4 A more difficult situa-
163. 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
164. See Campbell, 368 U.S. at 302.
165. See id.
166. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-27, at 497 (2d ed. 1988).
167. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
168. See Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 190; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25524.1(b),
25524.2 (West 1977).
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982).
170. See Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 206-207.
171. See id. at 205.
172. See id. at 216.
173. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982);
Note, Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.: State Tort Claims and the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act, 38 MERCER L. REV. 925, 926 (1987).
174. See Pierce, Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law:
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tion arises when state law indirectly frustrates the achievement of
federal regulatory objectives. For example, state law may discour-
age conduct that federal law specifically intends to encourage. 175
State law may also interfere with federal law by encouraging ac-
tions that hinder federal statutory goals.' Some commentators
classify this latter situation as interference rather than conflict.17
McDermott v. Wisconsin'"5 illustrates what happens when it is
impossible to comply with both state and federal law. In McDer-
mott, the Court ruled that the labeling provisions of the Federal
Food and Drug Act 179 preempted a state labeling statute.'80 In that
case, the defendant, who sold syrup imported from another state,
showed that syrup meeting the standards of the federal act would
be treated as mislabeled under a Wisconsin statute.18' On the other
hand, compliance with the state act would have resulted in liability
under the federal act.'8 2 Because it was impossible to satisfy the
requirements of both statutes, the Court invalidated the state
statute. 83
Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Pirr. L. REv. 607, 630 (1985); Note, The
Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 623, 626 (1975).
175. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Harris, 459 U.S. 145, 154 (1982) (state tax on goods in-
tended to be shipped abroad held invalid because it conflicted with federal policy of encour-
aging overseas shippers to use American ports); Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S.
235, 239 (1967) (state unemployment compensation law declared invalid because it discour-
aged workers from filing unfair labor practice charges with NLRB).
176. See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973) (local
airport curfew declared invalid because it would interfere with FAA's ability to control air
traffic flow); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (state
damage award for union picketing conflicted with federal control over labor relations).
177. See Hirsch, supra note 116, at 526. Professor Hirsch, however, points out that
direct conflict and interference are not distinct categories, but rather are more like opposite
points along a continuum. See id. at 526.
178. 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
179. Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
180. See McDermott, 228 U.S. at 137.
181. See id. at 126-27.
182. See id. at 133.
183. See id. at 137. The question of impossibility also arose in Florida Lime and Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), where Florida avocado growers sought to
enjoin enforcement of a California statute which prohibited the sale of avocados containing
less than eight percent oil. Oil content was used as a measure of maturity by the state
statute. The plaintiffs claimed that this standard would exclude the sale of some avocados
which complied with federal marketing regulations. See id. at 134. The Court, however,
found that Florida growers could meet the California standards by leaving the fruit on the
trees beyond the earliest date permitted by the federal regulations. See id. at 143. Conse-
920
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A direct conflict may also occur when state law diminishes or
interferes with the exercise of a right created by federal law. 84 For
example, in Wissner v. Wissner,8 5 a married serviceman obtained
a National Life Insurance policy and named his mother as the
principal beneficiary. The serviceman's widow claimed that under
California community property law she was entitled to a share of
the proceeds of the insurance policy.'86 The federal statute, how-
ever, provided that the insured had the exclusive right to designate
a beneficiary.18 7 According to the Court, the right to obtain govern-
ment insurance and to designate a beneficiary enhanced morale
within the military.' Therefore, the Court held that federal law
should control the disposition of the insurance proceeds.' 89
Sometimes, provisions of federal law and state law do not ex-
pressly conflict, but their regulatory objectives may be incompati-
ble. '9 As suggested earlier, perhaps it is better to describe this as
interference rather than direct conflict. Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc.19' illustrates how state law may indirectly under-
mine federal regulatory goals. In Burbank, the plaintiff challenged
a municipal ordinance which prohibited jet aircraft from taking off
between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.192 The Court found that the Fed-
quently, the Court concluded that the California statute was not preempted by the federal
marketing regulations. See id. at 152; see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (state
marketing regulations for raisins not preempted by Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937).
184. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (Federal Arbitration Act
preempted state statute which purported to nullify certain arbitration clauses in contracts);
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235 (1981) (military retirement benefits not subject to
state law claims of divorced spouse); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 585 (1979)
(federal railroad retirement benefits not subject to state law claims of divorced spouse);
Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 404 (1963) (one who is not an attorney but who is author-
ized to practice before Patent Office cannot be barred from preparing patent applications in
Florida under state unauthorized practice law); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962) (sav-
ings bonds held in co-ownership pass to surviving co-owner rather than according to princi-
ples of state community property law).
185. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
186. See Wissner, 338 U.S. at 657.
187. See id. at 658.
188. See id. at 660.
189. See id. at 659.
190. See Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal's, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
191. See id.
192. See id. The federal district court granted the requested injunction. See Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc. v. Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914, 930 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 667,
676 (9th Cir. 1972).
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eral Aviation Act' 93 gave the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) broad authority to regulate air traffic in order to achieve
both aircraft safety and efficient utilization of navigable air-
space.'" If municipal airport curfews were upheld, the Court rea-
soned, fractionalized control of the timings of takeoffs and land-
ings would undermine the FAA's pervasive regulatory powers over
commercial aviation. 95 Accordingly, the Court determined that the
local ordinance was preempted. 9 6
The Court, however, reached a different result in Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee, Corp. 97 In Silkwood, the plaintiff, as administrator
of the decedent's estate, obtained an award of punitive damages
against the owner of a nuclear fuel fabrication plant for exposing
his daughter to plutonium. The defendant argued that the Atomic
Energy Act 9 8 precluded the states from awarding punitive dam-
ages against federal licensees. 19 The Court, however, rejected the
argument that payment of punitive damages by licensees conflicted
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's enforcement powers
which included civil penalties.20 0 Furthermore, the Court did not
feel that subjecting licensees to liability for punitive damages
would frustrate the congressional policy of promoting the use of
nuclear power.2 0 ' Finally, the Court disagreed with the contention
that punitive damages amounted to regulation of radiation hazards
by the states.2 2
193. 49 U.S.C. § 1301-1522 (1982).
194. See Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633.
195. See id. at 633.
196. See id. at 640.
197. 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984).
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982).
199. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249.
200. See id. at 257; 42 U.S.C. § 2282 (1982) (original version at Pub. L. No. 91-161, § 4,
83 Stat. 444, 444-45 (1969)).
201. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 257; 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1982) (Congressional purpose
behind Atomic Energy Act stated in Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 3, 68 Stat. 919, 922 (1946)).
202. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 257-58. The dissenting justices argued that punitive
damages were regulatory rather than compensatory in nature and, therefore, should be pre-
empted because such awards interfered with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's exclusive
regulatory control over nuclear safety. See id. at 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 274-75 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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D. Federalism and the Presumption Against Preemption
In theory, the Supremacy Clause 0 3 gives Congress plenary
power over those areas of responsibility assigned to the federal
government by the Constitution.20 4 At the same time, however, the
states have an important role to play in the federal system. There-
fore, it is not surprising that the courts have developed doctrines
to minimize conflicts between the federal government and the
states. One such principle is the presumption against preemption
which provides that the preemption doctrine shall not be applied
unless Congress manifests a clear intent to displace state law.20 5
Although the presumption against preemption has occasion-
ally been ignored in the past,206 Professor Tribe suggests that it is
completely consistent with the Court's current approach to federal-
state relations2 07 as reflected by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority.20 In Garcia, the Court declared that state
sovereignty was "more properly protected by procedural safe-
guards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judi-
cially created limitations on federal power. '20 9 According to Profes-
sor Tribe, the presumption against preemption furthers the policy
behind Garcia by requiring that decisions to restrict state power
be done by Congress explicitly.210 In this way, the political process
itself will ensure an appropriate balance between state and na-
tional interests.2 11 On the other hand, it would frustrate the very
process of lawmaking that Garcia relied on to protect states' inter-
ests if courts were to give preemptive effect to laws where congres-
203. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
204. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824); L. TRIBE, supra note 166,
§ 6-27, at 500.
205. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
206. For a discussion of expansive and restricted interpretations given the presumption
of preemption by the courts during the twentieth century, see Note, supra note 174, at 626-
39.
207. See L. TRIBE, supra note 166, § 6-27, at 500.
208. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Court in Garcia overruled its prior decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and held that state and local governments
were no longer immune from federal regulation under the commerce clause even when they
were exercising a "traditional governmental function." See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
209. Id. at 552.
210. See L. TRIBE, supra note 166, § 6.25, at 479-80.
211. See id.
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sional intent is ambiguous.212
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CIGARETTE COMPANY LIABILITY
This portion of the Article will examine the preemption doc-
trine's effect on failure to warn claims against cigarette manufac-
turers. This analysis will observe the conventional distinction be-
tween express preemption, occupation of the field and actual
conflict because most of the cigarette warning cases have done so.
The author concludes that products liability suits based on failure
to warn do not fall within any of the accepted preemption catego-
ries. Consequently, the preemption doctrine provides no support
for rejecting failure to warn claims.
A. Express Preemption
Section 1334(a) of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act 215 provides that no statement relating to health risks
from smoking shall be required on cigarette packages other than
the statement required by section 1333 of the Act.214 Section
1334(b) declares that no additional requirements or prohibitions
relating to smoking and health may be imposed under state law
with respect to advertising or promotion activities.215 Cigarette
manufacturers contend that these provisions expressly preempt
products liability claims based on failure to warn.216 As will be
shown, however, neither the legislative history of the Act nor the
language of section 1334 supports such a conclusion.
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act's legisla-
tive history reveals that at the time of its passage, a number of
states and municipalities were proposing to require cigarette man-
ufacturers to place stringent health warnings on their products.2 1 7
212. See id.
213. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982).
214. See id. This section states that "[n]o statement relating to smoking and health,
other than the statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any
cigarette package." Id.
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1982). This section states that "[n]o requirement or pro-
hibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this chapter." Id.
216. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984).
217. For example, the New York legislature enacted a cigarette labeling law in June,
1965. See 1965 N.Y. LAws ch. 479.
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Congress was concerned that differing and conflicting labeling re-
quirements would constitute a burden on interstate commerce.21
Section 1334 was enacted in response to this potential problem.21'
For this reason, section 1334 expressly prohibits state and local
governments from passing statutes or ordinances which impose la-
beling requirements or otherwise regulate the advertising or pro-
motional activities of cigarette companies. 220
There is nothing in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act's legislative history to suggest that Congress was con-
cerned about the effect of product liability suits on interstate com-
merce. In fact, there is some evidence that members of Congress
believed that the proposed Act would have no effect on such ac-
tions.2 21 For example, when Representative Springer and Repre-
sentative Fascell discussed the effect of the Act's required labeling
provisions on the defense of assumption of risk, Representative
Fascell concluded by stating that:
[t]he legislative record makes it clear that passage of this law and
compliance by the manufacturer in no way affects the right to
raise the defense of 'assumption of risk' and the legal requirement
for such a defense to prevail; nor does it shift the burden of proof,
nor could it be considered a legal or factual bar to the plaintiff
user. 
222
Moreover, when the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act was amended in 1969, some members of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce again concluded that the Act
would have no effect on personal injury claims brought by consum-
ers against cigarette companies under state law.223 Thus, Represen-
tative Watson declared that "nowhere in the Act of 1965 does it
218. See 111 CONG. REC. 13,901 (1965) (statement of Sen. Frank Moss); Cigarette La-
beling and Advertising, 1969: Hearings on H.R. 643, 1237, 3055, 6543 Before the House
Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1969) [hereinafter
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, 1969] (statement of Rep. Carl D. Perkins); Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising, 1969, supra, at 553 (statement of Joseph F. Cullman III).
219. See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, 1969, supra note 218, at 24-25 (statement
of Rep. L. H. Fountain).
220. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd,
822 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 487 (1988); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1190 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
221. See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
222. 111 CONG. REc. 16,543-45 (1965) (statement of Rep. Fascell) (emphasis added).
223. See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, 1969, supra note 218, at 579 (statement
of Rep. Watson).
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preclude an individual or prevent an individual from pursuing a
common-law liability action against any tobacco company .... 224
Nor does the text of section 1334 support the argument that
products liability actions are expressly preempted. Section 1334(a),
for example, merely provides that no statement on cigarette pack-
aging "shall be required" beyond that mandated by section 1333.225
Similarly, section 1334(b) states that "[n]o requirement or prohibi-
tion" with respect to the advertising or promotion of cigarettes
shall be imposed under state law.226 Both of these terms are consis-
tent with directions, backed by coercive power, which mandate or
forbid specific behavior and leave the affected party no room for
judgment or discretion. In other words, these terms are consistent
with direct governmental regulation.
On the other hand, one does not ordinarily use expressions
like requirement or prohibition to describe the effect of tort liabil-
ity. Of course, tort liability may provide a powerful incentive to
alter conduct and, therefore, may be used as a tool to promote par-
ticular governmental policies.22 Nevertheless, at least in a formal
sense, principles of substantive tort law are not like governmental
regulations because they do not compel parties to act in a particu-
lar manner.22
Dean Calabresi acknowledges this distinction by dividing acci-
dent cost avoidance methods into two categories: general deter-
rence and specific deterrence.229 Under general deterrence, deci-
sions about accident avoidance measures are left to market
processes, while under specific deterrence such decisions are made
collectively, that is, by an organ of the state.230
General deterrence is exemplified by a rule which holds manu-
facturers strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by defective
products.231 Such a rule exerts deterrent pressure on manufactur-
ers by forcing them to internalize the cost of compensating con-
224. Id.
225. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982).
226. Id. § 1334(b).
227. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
228. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd,
825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1156
(D.N.J. 1984).
229. See G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-129 (1970).
230. See id.
231. See id.
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sumers for their injuries. 32 Manufacturers will respond by spend-
ing money to make their products safer, but only as long as it is
cost-effective to do so.233 Thus, under a general deterrence regime,
manufacturers, not government officials, make decisions about
product safety.2 34 Moreover, these choices are based almost en-
tirely upon economic considerations.2 5
In contrast, specific deterrence mandates a particular choice
determined by the legislature or an administrative agency.2 36 Spe-
cific deterrence is exemplified by a penal law forbidding the sale of
a product without some specified safety device.237 For example, the
federal government may require all motor vehicles to have seat
belts. This decision may either reflect a collective decision that
seat belts are cost effective from an accident cost avoidance point
of view, or it may reflect noneconomic community values. 38
As the foregoing discussion indicates, general deterrence and
specific deterrence represent completely different approaches to
the problem of accident cost avoidance. Regulations such as those
contemplated by a number of state and local governments prior to
the passage of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
were examples of specific deterrence: they would have required to-
bacco companies to place specific language on cigarette labels.2 9
This was the type of state activity the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act expressly prohibited.240 On the other hand,
strict products liability is a classic example of general deter-
rence. 41 It relies on market forces, not governmental coercion, to
influence manufacturer behavior.242 Because of this fundamental
difference between specific and general deterrence, it is difficult to
see how federal legislation that preempted acts of specific deter-
rence by the states would necessarily preempt general deterrence
measures as well.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 73-75.
236. See id. at 68-129.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 97-102.
239. See 1965 N.Y. LAws. ch. 470.
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1982).
241. See Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
CoSts, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 652-53 (1971).
242. See id.
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Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,"43 a recent decision by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, explicitly recognized this
distinction between tort liability and direct government regulation
for purposes of preemption analysis. 4 " In Ferebee, the plaintiff
sought to recover damages against the manufacturer of paraquat, a
toxic herbicide, based on a theory of inadequate warning. The
manufacturer contended that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act 24 5 preempted suits of this nature when the
product manufacturer complied with labeling requirements estab-
lished by the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the
statute.2 46 The court, however, declared that damage awards did
not constitute regulation because they did not compel the defend-
ant to change its label.2 '7
B. Federal Occupation of the Field
Congressional intent to occupy a field can be implied from the
pervasive nature of the federal regulatory scheme or from the exis-
tence of a dominant federal interest in the area subject to regula-
tion.2 48 Neither of these theories, however, seems applicable to a
state products liability action.
Section 1331 of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertis-
ing Act declares that Congress intended to implement a "compre-
hensive federal program" with respect to health warnings in ciga-
rette labeling and advertising.249 The regulatory scheme, however,
established by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
with respect to cigarette labeling and advertising is not really com-
prehensive in scope.2 50 The Act is not part of an expansive federal
plan to regulate the cigarette industry, nor is it part of a program
to impose federal labeling standards on a broad category of prod-
ucts. Rather, as its legislative history indicates, the Act was passed
243. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
244. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1529.
245. 7 U.S.C. § 136a-136y (1982).
246. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540.
247. See id. at 1541. The court declared that a damage award "may in some sense im-
pose a burden on the sale of paraquat in Maryland, but it is not equivalent to a direct
regulatory command that Chevron change its label." Id.
248. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
249. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
250. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1176 (D. Mass. 1986); Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1165 n.12 (D.N.J. 1984).
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to prevent the states from subjecting cigarette sellers to numerous,
and possibly conflicting, labeling requirements. 251 Thus, the Fed-
eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act is a highly focused re-
sponse to a narrow problem; it is not part of larger federal regula-
tory scheme. For this reason, one cannot infer a congressional
intent to exclude products liability suits against cigarette manufac-
turers based on the existence of a pervasive federal regulatory
scheme. 52
Moreover, allowance of products liability claims against ciga-
rette manufacturers will not affect any dominant federal interest.
The only federal interest involved in cigarette labeling is the pro-
tection of interstate commerce.2 53 This interest, while important, is
not so inherently vital to the federal government that state action
in related areas should be completely excluded.254 Therefore, there
is no reason to conclude that products liability actions under state
law should be preempted because of federal occupation of the field.
C. Actual Conflict
Actual conflict may occur when there is a direct conflict be-
tween the requirements of federal and state law or when state reg-
ulation frustrates or impedes the attainment of federal regulatory
objectives.2 55 There is no direct conflict between federal cigarette
labeling requirements and the duty to warn under state tort law
because a manufacturer is free to provide additional warnings
251. See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, 1969, supra note 218, at 24-25 (statement
of Rep. Carl D. Perkins).
252. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 1986). Further-
more, a finding of preemption becomes less likely as the federal regulatory scheme becomes
less comprehensive. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 336-37
(1973); L. TRIBE, supra note 166, § 6-27, at 497.
253. See Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1171.
254. State action that incidentally affects interstate commerce has often been upheld so
long as it does not discriminate against nonresidents. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-73 (1981); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (state marketing standards for avocados upheld even though
out-of-state avocado growers would be inconvenienced); South Carolina State Highway
Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938) (state weight and width restrictions on
trucks upheld even though many trucks engaged in interstate commerce would be affected).
But see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (state ban on sixty-
five-foot double tractor trailers held invalid as an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce).
255. See Note, supra note 122, at 1234-36.
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without violating the Act.2 56 Preemption, therefore, would have to
be based on interference with the objectives of the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act rather than direct conflict be-
tween the Act and the allowance of tort claims based on failure to
warn.
In order to decide if products liability actions interfere with
federal regulatory objectives, one must first determine the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act's purposes and then con-
sider whether lawsuits against cigarette manufacturers frustrate
these goals.2 5 Congress had a number of objectives in mind when
it passed the cigarette labeling act in 1965.258 One goal was to safe-
guard the consumer's right to make informed choices about smok-
ing.2 5e Another was to protect interstate commerce from the bur-
den of diverse state regulatory standards.2 60
The author believes that Congress adopted minimum labeling
standards as an appropriate means of implementing these objec-
tives. Minimum standards would protect consumer interests while
permitting tobacco companies to sell their products in an inter-
state market free of diverse and inconsistent state labeling regula-
tions. Under this interpretation, common law claims against ciga-
rette companies based on a failure to warn should be allowed
because they are not at variance with the objectives of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.
1. Protection of Consumer Interests
The Act protected consumer interests in two ways. First, the
Act recognized the consumer's right to decide whether or not to
smoke and second, it provided consumers with information about
the dangers of smoking.
256. See Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1177; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp.
1146, 1167 (D.N.J. 1984). Even if the Act prohibited manufacturers from providing addi-
tional warnings, compliance with the Act would still be possible since tort liability would not
compel them to change the existing warnings.
257. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50,
63 (3d Cir. 1980).
258. See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, 1969, supra note 218 (statement of Rep.
Carl D. Perkins).
259. See id.
260. See id.
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a. Freedom of Choice for Consumers
The Act reflects the commitment of Congress to the principle
of freedom of choice. During legislative hearings on the Act, a
number of witnesses, including those who thought that smoking
was dangerous, expressed their opposition to a federal ban on the
manufacture of cigarettes and emphasized that smoking should be
a matter of personal choice.2 6' In its report to Congress, the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce also declared that
consumers must be given the right to decide for themselves
whether or not to smoke. 62 For this reason, the Act did not at-
tempt to regulate the tobacco industry or to restrict the sale of
cigarettes.263
Allowance of products liability claims against cigarette manu-
facturers does not conflict with freedom of choice for consumers. If
cigarette companies seek to avoid future tort liability by providing
better warnings, consumers will have more information about the
health risks of smoking and, therefore, will be better equipped to
decide whether or not to smoke.2 64 If tobacco companies refuse to
modify their warnings, the cost of cigarettes may increase as if
they are held liable, but consumers will still be able to purchase
cigarettes if they wish.
b. Informing Consumers About the Health Risks of Smoking
The Act also declared that one of its purposes was to ensure
that "the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smok-
ing may be hazardous to health by an inclusion of a warning to
261. See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 1965: Hearings on H.R. 2248, 3014, 4007
& 4249 Before the House Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 225 (1965) (statement of Emerson Foote, Chairman, National Interagency Council on
Smoking and Health); Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings on H.R. 2248, 3014,
4007 & 4249 Before the House Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1965) (statement of Rep. Morris Udall). Witnesses expressed this same view
when the Act was renewed in 1969. See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, 1969, supra
note 218, at 348 (statement of Dr. Sol Baker, Chairman, Committee on Tobacco and Cancer,
American Cancer Society).
262. See HR. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2350, 2352 (Committee believes that individual's freedom of choice
must be protected).
263. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1159; see Note, supra note 2, at 1155.
264. See Note, supra note 18, at 1057.
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that effect on each package of cigarettes.116 5 Permitting consumers
to recover against tobacco companies for failure to warn does not
frustrate the Act's consumer information goal, but instead pro-
motes it. Holding cigarette manufacturers strictly liable for placing
inadequate warnings on their products will encourage them to pro-
vide better warnings in the future and thereby allow consumers to
make more informed decisions about smoking.26 6
2. Protection of Interstate Commerce
The Act manifests a clear congressional intent to protect the
national economy. 6 7 This, of course, includes the tobacco indus-
try.2 68 This does not mean, however, that Congress meant to insu-
late cigarette companies from tort liability when it adopted
mandatory labeling legislation. To be sure, politicians from the to-
bacco states played a major role in formulating the labeling stat-
ute. 69 Cigarette companies, however, were more concerned with re-
stricting state regulation than with obtaining immunity from tort
liability.
There is nothing in the Act's language that suggests that Con-
gress intended to immunize cigarette manufacturers from tort lia-
bility.270 The Act does not even mention tort liability and there are
very few references to it in the Act's legislative history.2 71 If Con-
gress had intended to grant broad immunity to cigarette manufac-
turers, it almost certainly would have done so explicitly. 72
265. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (1982); see
also H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2350.
266. See Note, supra note 18, at 1057.
267. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The Act, however, qualified this goal
by adding the "to the maximum extent consistent" language in addition to its declared
policy of adequately informing the public of the health risks of cigarette smoking.
268. See, e.g., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 622 (1st Cir. 1987); Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1147 (D.N.J. 1984). At the time of the Act's adop-
tion, tobacco ranked third in agricultural export products, fifth among all cash crops, and
supported 750,000 farm families. See Palmer, 825 F.2d at 622 n.2 (citing 111 CONG. REc.
13,898, 13,950 (1965) (remarks of Senators Ervin and Bass)).
269. See Drew, The Quiet Victory of the Cigarette Lobby, ATLrTIC MONTHLY, Sept.
1965, at 76, 80.
270. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
271. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
272. Congress could, of course, exclude state regulation without enacting any regula-
tions itself. See L. TRIBE, supra note 166, § 6-23, at 376. In this case, however, the tobacco
industry appears to have been willing to accept some sort of warning requirement from
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Instead, the Act merely intended to prevent the states from
enacting cigarette labeling regulations of their own. Congress be-
lieved that those who sold cigarettes in a national market would
have difficulty complying with diverse and potentially inconsistent
state regulations . 7  The result would hamper economic activity
and burden interstate commerce.
Arguably, interstate commerce would also be affected if manu-
facturers were subjected to diverse standards under common law
with respect to cigarette labeling. This conclusion served as the ba-
sis for the court's finding of preemption in Cipollone27 5 and
Palmer .2 7 However, this author believes that product manufactur-
ers can contend with differences among state common law doc-
trines much more easily than they can contend with conflicting
state regulation. For this reason, common law tort claims should
not be preempted on the theory that they conflict with federal reg-
ulatory goals.
If one assumes that cigarette companies operate in the same
market environment as other product sellers, there is no basis for
finding that a conflict exists between tort liability and the Act. All
product manufacturers must contend with variations among state
common law doctrines. Manufacturers can cope with these difficul-
ties, however, because tort doctrines, unlike government regula-
tions, allow for flexibility.
Tobacco companies may argue that they lack sufficient flexi-
bility to respond to differing state standards because they are re-
quired by the Act to use specific language on their labels and in
their advertising. However, since the Act allows cigarette manufac-
turers to provide additional warnings,7 they may easily satisfy
both state and federal requirements.
This conclusion is further reinforced by the approach taken by
Congress when it decided to impose labeling requirements on the
sellers of smokeless tobacco products. The Comprehensive Smoke-
less Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986278 closely resembles the
Congress in order to avoid the consequences of more rigorous state regulation. See Note,
supra note 18, at 1033, 1060 n.229.
273. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
274. See id.
275. 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1167 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
276. 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
277. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1167; see also Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1177.
278. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (Supp.
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cigarette labeling statute. The only significant difference between
the two statutes is that the Smokeless Act's legislative history is
more explicit about the right of manufacturers to add additional
warnings to their products. 9
The Smokeless Act contains a preemption section that is simi-
lar to the cigarette labeling statute's preemption provision.2 80 Con-
gress, however, also added a savings clause which preserved com-
mon law claims based on failure to warn.2"' This suggests that
Congress does not believe that potentially differing standards of
liability under state products liability law burden product sellers
as much as differing state regulatory statutes.2 2
3. Uniform Versus Minimum Labeling Requirements
Even though failure to warn claims against cigarette manufac-
turers do not conflict with any of the Act's purposes, they may be
inconsistent with the means chosen by Congress to achieve the
objectives of the Act. In particular, if the Act is construed to man-
date uniform warnings, the coercive effect of potential tort liability
may undermine a goal of uniformity. On the other hand, if the Act
merely sets forth a minimum standard with respect to warnings,
congressional policy would not be frustrated if cigarette manufac-
turers provided better warnings in order to avoid tort liability. For
this reason, it will be necessary to determine whether the Act re-
quires uniform warnings or merely imposes a minimum standard.
One can argue that the Congress intended to establish a
scheme of uniform cigarette labeling, thereby prohibiting anyone
from changing or supplementing the precise language mandated by
the Act. Certainly, Congress expressed concern about the economic
hardship that would result if cigarette manufacturers were forced
to comply with diverse labeling requirements imposed upon them
by state law.2 3 Moreover, Congress not only prohibited the states
1987)).
279. See S. REP. No. 209, 99 Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7, 13. The Senate Committee Report expressly stated that manufacturers,
packagers and importers may add warnings to those required by the Smokeless Act. See id.
280. See Pub. L. No. 99-252, § 7(a), (b), 100 Stat. 30, 34 (1986).
281. See id. at § 7(c). The statute provides that "nothing in this Act shall relieve any
person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other person." Id.
282. See Note, (Preemption), supra note 16, at 904.
283. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2) (1982).
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from legislating in this area, but also placed specific language in
the Act rather than delegating this responsibility to an administra-
tive agency.2814
If the Act requires a uniform warning, product liability suits
based on failure to warn would probably be preempted by the Act.
Otherwise, manufacturers would be forced to choose between com-
pliance with the Act and payment of tort damages. Arguably, the
imposition of such a choice on manufacturers would conflict with
the purposes of the Act.2 85
It appears, however, that Congress did not intend to require
uniform labeling because it left cigarette manufacturers free to
place additional warnings on their packaging. Section 1334(a) pro-
vides that no statement shall be required on any cigarette package;
additionally, section 1334(b) provides that no requirement or pro-
hibition with respect to advertising or promotion shall be imposed
under State law.286 This language indicates that the Act merely
prohibited the states from forcing manufacturers to modify ex-
isting warnings, but would not prevent manufacturers from volun-
tarily providing additional warnings in their labeling or
advertising.2817
Furthermore, a uniform warning that could not be voluntarily
supplemented by cigarette manufacturers would in effect become a
maximum standard. This seems inconsistent with the Act's avowed
purpose of informing the public about the health risks of smoking.
Congress could hardly object to cigarette companies supplying
more information to consumers as long as additional warnings did
not dilute the effectiveness of the statutorily required language.288
Thus, while the Act may provide for a scheme of uniform fed-
eral regulation of cigarette labeling, it does not necessarily require
uniform warnings.2 9 A more likely conclusion is that Congress
merely intended to impose minimum labeling requirements on cig-
284. See id.
285. See Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627-28.
286. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
287. See, e.g., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (D. Mass. 1986);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1167 (D.N.J. 1984); see also Comment,
Common Law Claims Challenging Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings Preempted Under the
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965: Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 60 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 754, 765 (1986).
288. See Note, (Preemption), supra note 16, at 910.
289. See id. at 896.
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arette manufacturers.2 90 This interpretation is consistent with
many other examples of federal regulatory legislation which merely
establish a floor and leave state courts free to encourage higher
standards through the imposition of tort liability.
29 1
For example, the courts have treated federal motor vehicle
safety standards established under the Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Act of 1966212 as minimum rather than maximum standards.2 3
Consequently, injured consumers have been permitted to bring
products liability actions against automobile manufacturers based
on defective design even when the designs in question comply with
federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS).2 94 The courts
have allowed such suits to be brought even though the states are
prohibited from imposing higher safety standards upon automobile
manufacturers by direct regulation.29
The courts have taken the same approach when federal warn-
ing or labeling requirements have been involved. Thus, a federal
court in Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp.296 concluded that a man-
ufacturer could be held strictly liable to a young girl whose flan-
nelette nightgown caught fire even though the product complied
with federal flammability standards.297 Furthermore, consumers
290. See id. at 896-97; see also Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1168.
291. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1985) (pesticide control).
292. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982).
293. See id.
294. See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 1985)
(FMVSS not conclusive); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1517 (6th Cir. 1983)
(compliance with FMVSS only a guide and not conclusive); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655
F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 1981) (compliance with federal safety standards does not exempt
manufacturer from common law liability); Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 784 (10th
Cir. 1978) (federal seatbelt standards are minimum requirements only); Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968) (federal act designed to supplement com-
mon law); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 540, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605,
609 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (manufacturer of pickup truck may be held liable for failure to
provide headrest even though not required to by NHTSA); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d
551, 562, 225 N.W.2d 431, 438 (1975) (federal regulations are supplementary to common law
products liability).
295. See 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (Supp. 1987); see also Wilton, Federalism Issues in "No
Airbag" Tort Claims: Preemption and Reciprocal Comity, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 14
(1985).
296. 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973).
297. See The Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1982), which authorizes
the Secretary of Commerce to establish flammability standards and expressly preempted
inconsistent state standards. See id. § 1203. The court, however, interpreted the statute's
preemption provision narrowly and concluded that it would not bar product liability actions
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have been allowed to sue drug manufacturers for a failure to warn
even though their warnings were approved by the Federal Drug
Administration. 298 Finally, manufacturers of pesticides have been
held liable for inadequate warnings even though their warnings
complied with federal labeling requirements.299
These cases suggest that federal legislation that establishes
minimum design or labeling standards will usually not preempt
suits against product manufacturers. Admittedly, there are differ-
ences between these statutes and the federal cigarette labeling act.
For example, in all of the cases discussed above, either the manu-
facturer or a federal agency formulated the standard in question.
However, in the Act's case, Congress itself composed the warning
after lengthy consideration and debate. Moreover, unlike some of
the other statutes considered above, o0 the Act did not preserve
in cases where the manufacturer could have made a safer product. See Riegel, 484 F.2d at
1027.
298. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981) (FDA
approved package insert warning for oral contraceptives found to be inadequate); MacDon-
ald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 31, 36-37, 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass. 1985)
(FDA approval of package insert warning for oral contraceptives did not preempt suit based
on failure to warn about danger of stroke); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429,
461, 479 A.2d 374, 390-91 (N.J. 1984) (manufacturer of antibiotic had a duty to urge FDA to
change existing warning as new information became available).
There is a split of authority over whether injured consumers can sue manufacturers of
DPT vaccine for failure to warn when the product complies with FDA labeling require-
ments. Cf. Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1493-94 (D. Kan. 1987) (tort
claim based on failure to warn not preempted by FDA regulations); Wack v. Lederle Labo-
ratories, 666 F. Supp. 123, 128 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (no preemption); Martinkovic v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 215 (N.D. IM. 1987) (no preemption); Morris v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1340 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (no preemption); MacGillivray V.
Lederle Laboratories, 667 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D.N.M. 1987) (no preemption); Hurley v. Led-
erle Laboratories, 651 F. Supp. 993, 1007 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (allowance of failure to warn
claim would destroy uniformity of FDA labeling regulations). See generally Wilson & McK-
owen, Federal Preemption in DPT Cases, 24 TRiA 58 (1988).
299. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (FIFRA
does not preempt product liability suit based on failure to warn); Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co.
v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965) (compliance with federal warning require-
ments did not preclude liability for negligent failure to warn).
300. The National Highway Traffic Safety Act provides that "[c]ompliance with any
Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any
person from any liability under common law." 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1982). Under the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, manufacturers formulate warnings and submit them to the
FDA for its approval. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982). Furthermore, FDA regulations assign
primary responsibility to drug manufacturers to warn the public of newly discovered risks
associated with their products. See 30 Fed. Reg. 993, 993-94 (1965); see also McEwen v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 398, 528 P.2d 522, 534-35 (1974) (FDA regulations
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common law liability or expressly provide for state participation in
the federal regulatory scheme.301 Despite these differences, how-
ever, the Act still bears a strong resemblance to other federal mini-
mum standards legislation.
D. The Presumption Against Preemption
As mentioned earlier, the United States Supreme Court has
often declared that it will not rule that a state is preempted unless
the nature of the matter subject to regulation permits no other
conclusion or that Congress has unambiguously expressed its in-
tention to exclude state regulation.302 This presumption is even
stronger in cases where preemption would deprive an injured party
of a remedy under state law without providing an equivalent sub-
stitute under federal law.3 03
This presumption against preemption reinforces the conclu-
sion that the Act does not prohibit products liability actions
against cigarette manufacturers. Preemption of such actions would
infringe upon the states' traditional interests in protecting the
health and safety of their citizens.304 In addition, preemption
would strip injured consumers of their most promising theory of
recovery against cigarette manufacturers and would probably leave
them without a remedy. For these reasons, the presumption
against preemption is especially strong. 05
give manufacturer, not FDA, primary responsibility or adequacy and timeliness of
warnings).
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) must approve package labeling for certain pesticides and
the states are prohibited from imposing any additional labeling requirements on pesticide
manufacturers. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1982). FIFRA, however, allows the states to impose
regulations on the use of EPA-approved pesticides that are more stringent than those im-
posed by the EPA itself. See id. at § 136v(a); see also Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541; S. REP. No.
838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4021
(general intent of this provision is to allow the states to impose greater restrictions on pesti-
cide use than those required under FIFRA); S. REP. No. 970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4128.
301. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
302. See Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,
450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
303. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984).
304. See Note, (Preemption), supra note 16, at 915-16.
305. See Comment, supra note 20, at 662.
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Neither the Act itself, nor its legislative history, indicates that
Congress intended to limit the right of injured consumers to seek
recovery against cigarette manufacturers.3 0 6 Furthermore, as the
foregoing discussion suggests, products liability suits against ciga-
rette manufacturers are not likely to obstruct or frustrate any of
the Act's apparent purposes, nor should state law be preempted
because of potential or hypothetical conflicts between state and
federal law.30 7 If Congress wished to preempt products liability ac-
tions, it could have easily done so. Because Congress did not mani-
fest such an intent, and because no conflict exists between federal
and state objectives, the presumption against preemption should
be applied in cigarette warning cases.
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS OF CIGARETTE COMPANY LIABILITY
This portion of the Article evaluates the policies that underlie
strict products liability. These include loss-spreading, promotion of
product safety, market deterrence and fulfillment of consumer ex-
pectations.3 08 In general, these policies support the imposition of
tort liability on cigarette manufacturers. Part IV also evaluates
some of the arguments that might be raised against the imposition
of strict liability on cigarette companies. Most of these arguments
invoke fairness considerations as a basis for withholding liability.30 9
These include such concerns as reliance by manufacturers on ex-
isting legal rules, impairment of consumer choice, culpable conduct
by victims, and avoiding economic harm to innocent third parties.
A. Arguments for Holding Cigarette Companies Strictly Liable
Courts and commentators have invoked a number of public
policies to justify holding sellers strictly liable to consumers for in-
juries caused by defective products.3 10 For example, strict liability
facilitates loss-spreading by shifting the cost of injuries from acci-
dent victims to product manufacturers.311 It also encourages manu-
306. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
307. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); see also Comment,
supra note 287, at 764.
308. See infra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
309. See infra notes 310-14.
310. See generally Powers, Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict
Liability, 62 N.C.L. REv. 415, 423-28 (1984).
311. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
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facturers to invest resources in product safety and thereby reduce
accident costs. 2 In addition, strict liability promotes an efficient
allocation of resources by ensuring that the prices of products re-
flect their true social costs.3 13 Finally, this theory is justified on the
grounds that manufacturers impliedly represent their products as
safe and should be made to compensate injured consumers when
they are not.3 14 Each of these rationales provide strong support for
the imposition of strict liability on cigarette manufacturers.
1. Loss-Spreading
Risk distribution or loss-spreading can be justified on both
fairness and utilitarian grounds. Fairness dictates that those who
benefit from an injury-producing activity be required to compen-
sate those who suffer harm.3 15 In addition, secondary costs316 can
often be reduced if economic losses are spread among large groups
instead of being allowed to fall randomly upon a few individuals.3 17
Loss-spreading is partly based on fairness considerations. Few
persons would quarrel with the proposition that those who enjoy
the benefits of an activity should assume responsibility for the bur-
dens or costs that the activity generates.3 18 Conversely, it is unde-
sirable without good reason to shift the cost of an activity to those
who do not benefit from it.319
Loss-spreading may also be justified on utilitarian grounds be-
YALE L.J. 1099, 1120-22 (1960).
312. See Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict
Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 809 (1976).
313. See McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 3,
41-42 (1970).
314. See Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
681, 684 (1980).
315. See Note, (Plaintiff's Conduct), supra note 16, at 821.
316. In the context of accidents, primary costs refer to the direct physical or economic
costs of accidents; secondary costs refer to the indirect or consequential costs that affect
accident victims, their families and others when primary accident costs are borne solely by
the victim. See G. CALABREsI, supra note 229, at 26-27.
317. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF THE LAW 141 (2d ed. 1977); Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517 (1961).
318. See Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153,
158 (1976).
319. Of course, society often chooses to subsidize an activity. In such a case, the activity
itself should have extremely high social utility or the decision to subsidize should be sup-
portable on wealth distribution grounds. See G. CALAIRESI, supra note 229, at 26-27.
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cause it reduces secondary accident costs.32 0 Society benefits from
loss-spreading because secondary costs of injuries are reduced
when primary accident costs are shifted from the victim and
spread among a large group of people. 21 Casualty insurance com-
panies operate on this principle when they spread the cost of an
accident among a risk pool of policyholders.
The concept of loss-spreading demands that liability for prod-
uct injuries be placed on the party who can best absorb and spread
the cost of compensation.2 2 Where injuries are caused by defective
products, it is proper to shift the loss from injured consumers to
those who profit or benefit from the presence of the product in the
market.2 s For this reason, manufacturers are appropriate loss-
spreaders because they profit from injury-causing activities. 24 Fur-
thermore, manufacturers typically have the capacity to spread the
costs of product injuries because they can insure against such
losses3 and treat the expense as a cost of production. 21 Moreover,
because manufacturers typically sell to a mass market, the incre-
320. Loss-spreading should be distinguished from loss-shifting in this respect. Shifting
accident or other costs from one individual to another will have little effect on secondary
costs unless one of the parties is considerably wealthier than the other. See id.
321. See Calabresi, supra note 317, at 517-18. This is a variant on the diminishing mar-
ginal utility of money theory. See id. According to this principle, each dollar that a person
acquires provides less utility than the previous dollar. See Note, Sales of Defective Used
Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 817 (1979).
322. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 31, 560 P.2d 3, 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579
(1977); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181-82
(1970); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); see also Montgomery & Owen, supra note 312, at 809-10; Note, supra
note 321, at 517-27.
323. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 IMI. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965);
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 206, 447 A.2d 539, 547 (1982).
324. See Gershonowitz, supra note 58, at 105; Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of
Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
1036, 1039 (1980); Comment, Application of Strict Liability to Repairers: A Proposal for
Legislative Action in the Face of Judicial Inaction, 8 PAC. L.J. 865, 878 (1977). But see
Britain, supra note 58, at 410 (manufacturer not always the best loss-spreader).
325. See Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64
MIcH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966); see also Mallor, Liability Without Fault for Professional
Services: Toward a New Standard of Professional Accountability, 9 SETON HALL L. REV.
474, 478 (1978).
326. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1979); Greenfield, Con-
sumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in
Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 661, 691; Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and
the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEx. L. REv. 855, 856 (1963).
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mental cost to each consumer from such price increases is small.3 7
As mentioned earlier, the principle of loss-spreading does not
support shifting accident costs to those who derive no benefit from
the injury-producing activity. At the present time, however,
neither cigarette companies nor smokers actually pay most of the
health costs of smoking.3 28 Instead, these costs are shifted to other
groups which include large numbers of nonsmokers. For example,
smoking-related health costs are borne by private health insurance
plans which charge the same rates to smokers and nonsmokers. 29
In addition, the federal government absorbs smoking-related costs
through disability and survivors benefit programs under Social Se-
curity,330 Medicare and Medicaid.331 Similarly, health care and
other benefits by the Veterans' Administration332 include smoking-
related health costs. Finally, payments to welfare recipients for
health care also cover smoking-related costs. 3 33 All of these pro-
grams are supported by taxes which are levied upon smokers and
nonsmokers alike.
There is no apparent reason to exempt cigarette manufactur-
ers from their loss-spreading responsibilities. The market for to-
bacco products is extremely large. At least 50 million Americans
smoke, 34 and tobacco companies sell more than 600 billion ciga-
rettes a year in the United States335 and receive almost $30 billion
in revenue.336 The tobacco industry is highly lucrative and industry
profits amount to $3.1 billion each year. 337 Thus, cigarette compa-
nies not only profit from the sale of an injury-causing product, but
receive sufficient revenue from cigarette sales to enable them to
327. See Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel Under Assault, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 13, 16 (1978); see also Note, Liability of a Manufacturer for Products Defec-
tively Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1025, 1080 (1982).
328. See Comment, supra note 20, at 645. One recent study suggested that nonsmokers
bore as much as sixty-two percent of these costs. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
SMOKING-RELATED DEATHS AND FINANCIAL COSTS 56 (1985).
329. See Garner, supra note 1, at 1462; see also Note, supra note 18, at 1072.
330. See Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 272, 293 (1977).
331. See Note, (Plaintiffs' Conduct), supra note 16, at 823 n.76 (costs estimated at $2.1
to $7.1 billion per year).
332. See Garner, supra note 330.
333. See Note, (Plaintiffs' Conduct), supra note 16, at 823 n.76.
334. See id. at 809 n.5.
335. See Note, supra note 41, at 167 n.12
336. See Note, supra note 2, at 1137.
337. See Comment, supra note 46, at 270.
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pay substantial amounts of money for purposes of compensation.
The tobacco industry may propose challenges to the loss-
spreading rationale. First, cigarette companies may claim that lia-
bility for the health costs of smoking would be so great that they
would be unable to spread losses effectively through the pricing
mechanism. Second, they may contend that litigation is a poor
method for spreading losses because its administrative costs are so
high. Although these arguments have some merit, they are not suf-
ficiently compelling to justify a rule that immunizes cigarette com-
panies from tort liability.
The total health costs of smoking are obviously substantial.
According to one estimate, the United States spends $22 billion
per year to treat smoking related diseases; lost productivity costs
due to smoking related illness and death amount to another $43
billion. 8 It is doubtful that cigarette companies could spread lia-
bility of this magnitude solely through the pricing mechanism. For
example, if smokers were required to bear the entire social cost of
smoking-$65 billion-the cost would add $2.16 to the price of a
pack of cigarettes.339 Even if loss-spreading were limited to the di-
rect health care costs of smoking, estimated at $22 billion, the cost
of a pack of cigarettes would rise by about seventy-three cents.4
In all probability, price increases of this magnitude would have a
serious impact on the market for tobacco products.
Of course, cigarette manufacturers will probably not pay all of
these costs even if they are held strictly liable. In the first place,
many victims will not sue at all or will accept minimal settlements
in order to avoid the financial and psychic costs of litigation. 41
Those who do sue will have to overcome causation and other proof
problems.4 2 Furthermore, in many cases tobacco companies will be
able to invoke statutes of limitations or repose and raise affirma-
338. See Blasi & Monaghan, The First Amendment and Cigarette Advertising, 256 J.
A.M.A 502, 502 (1986); see also H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(12) (1986).
339. See Tribe, supra note 55, at 788-89 (shifting health costs to cigarette companies
would triple the cost of a carton of cigarettes); see also Note, supra note 2, at 1156 (price of
cigarettes would increase to $2.50 a pack).
340. See Note, supra note 41, at 167 n.12. This assumes that 30 billion packs of ciga-
rettes, containing twenty cigarettes each, are sold each year. See id.
341. See Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases, 6 PEP-
PERDINE L. REv. 139, 142 (1978) (some victims will be unable to undergo the financial and
emotional stress of a lawsuit).
342. For a discussion of the causation issue see Note, supra note 18, at 1047-49.
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tive defenses such as comparative fault and assumption of risk."'
Nevertheless, tobacco companies will be exposed to substantial,
and possibly overwhelming, liability if they are required to com-
pensate injured consumers.
Cigarette manufacturers may also claim that the transaction
costs44 of litigation are so high that the imposition of strict liabil-
ity on them would not promote efficient loss-spreading. Instead,
existing compensation schemes, such as private health insurance
plans, workers' compensation programs and public health care pro-
grams, which spread costs more cheaply, are superior to litigation
and should be retained as the primary mechanisms for spreading
the health costs of smoking.
While there is some merit to this argument, the problem of
transaction costs is one that applies to products liability generally,
as well as to other types of tort litigation. 5 Therefore, cigarette
companies would have to show that transaction costs would be
substantially greater in tobacco litigation than they would be in
other products liability cases. Furthermore, the prospect of exces-
sive transaction costs does not necessarily support the case for to-
tal immunity. Tobacco companies and smokers should still be re-
quired to pay at least some portion of the health costs of smoking.
If products liability litigation is too costly, cigarette companies
should be required to contribute to some other type of compensa-
tion program in order to avoid tort liability.
2. Promotion of Product Safety
The imposition of strict liability on manufacturers also pro-
vides an incentive for them to make safer products.4 Manufactur-
ers are usually in a better position than consumers to reduce the
number of injuries from defective products. 47 Because manufac-
343. For a discussion of affirmative defenses see Garner, supra note 1, at 1448-52; see
also Note, supra note 41, at 185-89.
344. Dean Calabresi refers to these as "tertiary" costs. See G. CALABRsi, supra note
229, at 225-26.
345. Litigation costs consume substantial resources and often limit the amount of
money available for compensation. According to one estimate, in products liability cases,
victims actually receive only 37.5 cents out of every compensation dollar paid by manufac-
turers. See O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault In-
surance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv. 501, 510-12 (1976).
346. See Prosser, supra note 311, at 1119; see also Note, supra note 321, at 815.
347. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944);
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turers are intimately familiar with their products and because as-
sembly line production is well adapted to the use of product safety
tests, manufacturers can easily discover and correct defects. 48 Be-
cause they often make conscious decisions to increase product risks
in order to save money,34 9 strict liability counteracts this tendency
by forcing manufacturers to internalize the cost of product injuries.
This encourages an efficient level of investment in product
safety.350
At the present time, cigarette companies bear none of the
health costs of smoking. 1 Instead, as mentioned earlier, these
costs are borne primarily by private health insurance groups or by
the government.3 52 Because cigarette companies have largely exter-
nalized the health costs of smoking, they have no incentive to
devote resources to measures that will reduce these costs. There-
fore, it would appear that the imposition of strict liability upon
cigarette manufacturers will encourage them to reduce the health
costs of smoking.
The accident cost avoidance rationale is applicable to cigarette
companies, however, only if they have the actual or potential abil-
ity to affect health costs associated with smoking. The tobacco in-
dustry would no doubt contend that the health risks of smoking
are inherent and cannot be eliminated without changing the essen-
tial character of the product. It is incorrect to assume, however,
that cigarette manufacturers are completely unable to reduce the
toxic characteristics of their products. For example, there is evi-
dence that low tar and nicotine cigarettes are less dangerous than
standard varieties. 53 Filter tips may also reduce health risks some-
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 173-74, 406 A.2d 140, 151-52 (1979);
see also Prosser, supra note 311, at 1119-20; Note, Products and the Professional: Strict
Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 111, 117 (1972).
348. See Note, Strict Liability in Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 391, 394 (1980); Case
Note, TORTS-Strict Liability-The Medical Malpractice Citadel Still Stands-Hoven v.
KelbIe, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1978).
349. See Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Product Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1090-
92 (1965).
350. See Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 338-43
(1973); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1060, 1060-67 (1972); Cowan, supra note 349, at 1091.
351. See Note, supra note 2, at 1155.
352. See supra notes 328-33 and accompanying text.
353. See AMERICAN CANCER Socmry, DANGERS OF SMOKING: BENEFITS OF QUIrING &
RELATIVE RISKS OF REDUCED EXPOSURE 8 (rev. ed. 1980).
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what. 54 Cigarette companies could create greater consumer de-
mand for these "safer" types of cigarettes by advertising or pricing
strategies. In addition, cigarette companies could reduce health
risks by removing additives, pesticides and other dangerous sub-
stances from tobacco products. 55 Furthermore, even if existing
technology does not permit accident cost reduction, imposition of
strict liability on cigarette manufacturers will encourage them to
invest in research directed toward that purpose.3 56
Even if smoking cannot be made safer, strict liability will mo-
tivate cigarette manufacturers to provide more effective warnings.
Cigarette companies are more knowledgable than consumers about
the health risks of smoking. 51 7 Consumers cannot act properly un-
less they possess sufficient information to make informed deci-
sions. Therefore, it is appropriate to require cigarette manufactur-
ers to share their information with consumers. Warnings serve this
purpose.
Such warnings will reduce the health costs of smoking because
they reinforce other educational measures and induce consumers to
change their smoking habits.3 58 Furthermore, the monetary cost of
such warnings is usually small in relation to the health benefits
achieved.35 9 Because existing warnings are inadequate,3 0 product
safety will be enhanced if cigarette manufacturers are induced to
provide better ones.
3. Market Deterrence
Market deterrence also supports the imposition of strict liabil-
ity on product manufacturers. According to this theory, the prices
of goods should reflect their true social costs, including accident
and health costs.361 Unlike manufacturers, consumers generally un-
derassess the accident costs associated with use of defective prod-
354. See Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1979, supra note 33, at 14-29.
355. See Levin, supra note 34, at 216-17.
356. See Note, (Plaintiffs' Conduct), supra note 16, at 826.
357. See Note, supra note 18, at 1061.
358. See Garner, supra note 1, at 1462.
359. Warnings cost only about 0.0004 cents per pack of cigarettes. See Milio, Health
Policy and the Emerging Tobacco Reality, 21 Soc. SCL MED. 603, 607 (1985); see also Com-
ment, (Judicial), supra note 55, at 326 n.51.
360. See Note, supra note 18, at 1064-44.
361. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 229.
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ucts, leading to overconsumption of relatively risky products.362 By
causing the prices of products to more fully reflect their true social
costs, strict liability helps to reduce this overconsumption. 63
Lower consumption of these products will reduce the number of
injuries associated with them.3 16  Higher prices may also increase
the demand for safer (and less costly) substitutes.365 Normally, lia-
bility for product injuries should be placed on the manufacturer
because it is the party who can best ensure that these costs will be
reflected in the price of the product.3 66
Holding cigarette manufacturers liable for the health effects of
smoking appears to be consistent with the principle of market de-
terrence. At the present time, the health costs of smoking are not
reflected in the price of cigarettes. Moreover, a substantial part of
these costs are not borne by smokers, but are shifted to non-
smokers. 67 In addition, smokers are poorly informed about the
health risks of smoking and, therefore, are likely to underestimate
the danger of continuing to smoke.368 For these reasons smokers
"overconsume" tobacco products causing society to expend more of
its resources than it should on smoking-related health costs.3 69
Because smoking should pay for the injuries it causes, one so-
lution is to shift the cost of these injuries back to cigarette manu-
facturers. Tobacco companies, in turn, will incorporate these costs
into the price of cigarettes and ultimately pass them on to smok-
ers. Presumably, some smokers will react to higher prices by reduc-
ing their use of tobacco products.3 70 This, in turn, will eventually
cause the health costs of smoking to decline to a more acceptable
level.
Cigarette manufacturers may claim, however, that the price of
cigarettes already reflects the health costs of smoking because to-
362. See id. at 70.
363. See generally McKean, supra note 313.
364. See Henderson, supra note 324, at 1040.
365. See Note, supra note 321, at 813.
366. See Calabresi, supra note 317, at 505.
367. See Garner, supra note 1, at 1462.
368. See Note, supra note 18, at 1061.
369. See Note, (Plaintiffs' Conduct), supra note 16, at 825.
370. See id. One study indicated that teenagers and young adults were most responsive
to cigarette price increases. See Warner, Smoking and Health Implications of a Change in
the Federal Cigarette Excise Tax, 255 J. A-MA. 1028, 1029-31 (1986). Older smokers, how-
ever, are less responsive to price levels; the addictive nature of cigarettes may account for
this phenomenon. See id.
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bacco products are more heavily taxed than other consumer goods.
The federal government currently levies an excise tax of sixteen
cents a pack on cigarettes.3 1 In addition, state excise taxes on ciga-
rettes range from two cents to twenty-six cents a pack.372 These
taxes amount to almost $10 billion a year.3 78 Nevertheless, while
these taxes are substantial, they are not sufficient to cover more
than a small proportion of the health costs of smoking.3 7 4 As men-
tioned earlier, the direct medical costs of smoking are estimated at
$22 billion per year. 75 Excise taxes do not even amount to half of
that figure. Obviously, none of the estimated $43 billion in lost
productivity costs are recouped by excise taxes. Therefore, market
deterrence still provides a powerful argument for holding cigarette
companies strictly liable for the health costs of smoking.
4. Implied Representation of Safety
Some commentators have espoused a representational theory
of liability.37 6 Under this concept, strict liability is justified because
manufacturers impliedly represent their products to be safe.377 Ad-
vertising reinforces this representation of safety, and thus, engen-
ders a misplaced sense of security in the minds of consumers.
37S
Because product manufacturers create such expectations in order
to increase sales, they should compensate injured consumers when
reasonable expectations of safety are not met. In addition, repre-
sentations of safety in advertisements often cause consumers to
371. See Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986).
372. See Comment, supra note 55, at 332 n.63.
373. See R. TOLLISON, SMOKING AND SocmTY 253 (1986); see also Note, supra note 41, at
167 n.12.
374. See Garner, supra note 1, at 1463 n.260.
375. See Blasi & Monaghan, supra note 338.
376. See Greenfield, supra note 326, at 688; see also Shapo, A Representational Theory
of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function, and Legal Liability for Product Disappoint-
ment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
377. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 340, 363 A.2d 955,
958 (1976); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 266-67, 509 P.2d 529, 532-33 (1973);
see also Prosser, supra note 311, at 1123; Schwartz, Products Liability, and Bankruptcy:
Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 730 (1985).
Some commentators have criticized the implied representation theory as a basis for strict
liability. See Steffen, Enterprise Liability: Some Exploratory Comments, 17 HASTINGS L.J.
165, 167 (1965); Note, supra note 321, at 818 (implied representation of safety is a legal
fiction).
378. See Owen, supra note 314.
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underestimate product risk.3 79 Not only does this underassessment
of risk vitiate the effect of market deterrence, but in some cases it
may even nullify a consumer's consent to assume risks associated
with the product's use.38
According to this representational theory, cigarette companies
should be held strictly liable because they have consistently repre-
sented their products to the public as being safe. Until the mid-
1950's, cigarette advertisements explicitly claimed that smoking
was safe.381 Even today, cigarette advertisements suggest in subtle
ways that smoking is safe. For example, many advertisements fea-
ture young, attractive smokers engaging in sports or other physical
activities.382 In addition, the tobacco industry continues to deny
that cigarettes pose any serious threat to public health, thereby
undercutting the effect of mandatory warnings. 3 All of this, no
doubt, contributes to the fact that many smokers still do not fully
appreciate the health risks of smoking.3
8 '
Effective warnings might counteract this false impression of
safety. Cigarette companies, however, have never provided con-
sumers with adequate information about the health risks of smok-
ing. Cigarettes carried no warnings at all until 1966 when the Fed-
eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act compelled tobacco
companies to place a warning on their products.8 5 The warning
required by the Act was neither forceful nor specific. Nevertheless,
cigarette manufacturers did not supplement it with any additional
information. Although the statutory warning was strengthened re-
cently, it still fails to warn about many of the health risks of
smoking.38 6
379. See Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALIF.
L. REV. 919, 936 (1981); Mallor, supra note 325, at 478; Note, Protecting the Buyer of Used
Products: Is Strict Liability for Commercial Sellers Desirable?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 535, 544
(1981).
380. See Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 889 (1983) (representations may deprive consumer of the
chance to evaluate the risk and to decide whether to accept it).
381. See Levin, supra note 34, at 237.
382. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Realism: Legislative Bans on Tobacco Advertise-
ments and the First Amendment, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1193, 1207 (1986).
383. See generally P. TAYLOR, supra note 38; Note, supra note 18, at 1056.
384. See Levin, supra note 34, at 220; see also FTC STAFF REPORT ON THE CIGARETTE
ADVERTISING INVESTIGATION 5-21 (May 1981).
385. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
386. See Note, supra note 41, at 177-83.
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The tobacco industry has spent substantial amounts of money
on advertising to create the impression that smoking is safe.3 87 At
the same time, it has warned consumers about the health risks of
smoking only when required to do so by law. For this reason, in-
jured consumers may justifiably contend that cigarette companies
should bear some responsibility for their health problems.
B. Arguments for Limiting the Liability of Cigarette
Companies
The imposition of liability on cigarette manufacturers appears
to be consistent with many of the policy goals of products liability.
Other considerations, however, mostly based on fairness, may over-
ride these objectives. This section will evaluate some of the argu-
ments that might be advanced by the tobacco industry to justify
special protection against strict liability. For purposes of this anal-
ysis, the tobacco industry is defined to include anyone who directly
participates or economically benefits from the production, distribu-
tion or sale of tobacco or tobacco products.
1. Reliance on Existing Legal Standards
Cigarette companies may raise a number of equitable argu-
ments based on reliance upon existing legal standards to justify
their immunity from tort liability for failure to warn. First, they
may assert that liability rules should not be suddenly changed to
create a retroactive duty to warn where none existed before. Sec-
ond, cigarette manufacturers may claim that they reasonably as-
sumed that the Act's statutory language was sufficient to discharge
their duty to warn.
Cigarette manufacturers may contend that courts should not
suddenly, and without warning, change existing legal rules and
thereby increase their liability for failure to warn. In the words of
one commentator:
[i]t is the conventional wisdom that courts exist primarily to ad-
judicate disputes. A dispute generally concerns the legality of
someone's conduct and it is expected that the legality of the con-
duct will be judged as of the time it took place. It is also expected
387. See Levin, supra note 34, at 237. The tobacco industry spends about $2 billion a
year on cigarette advertising. See id.
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that the judging will be in accordance with reasonably knowable,
preexisting rules.3 88
If courts allow consumers to bring tort actions based on failure to
warn, cigarette companies will be faced with claims from hundreds
of thousands of smokers even if they immediately improved their
package labeling. Arguably, the imposition of such massive liability
on cigarette companies without prior warning is unjust.
If this argument has merit, it is applicable to all product man-
ufacturers, not just tobacco companies. The law of products liabil-
ity is a rapidly developing field and product manufacturers have
often been forced to contend with unexpected increases in liabil-
ity.389 Cigarette companies are no different in this respect than
other producers. Furthermore, injured consumers are not really
asking courts to subject cigarette companies to novel or enhanced
liability. Rather, they are merely arguing that cigarette companies
should be held strictly liable for failure to warn in the same man-
ner as other product sellers.
In addition, cigarette manufacturers may claim that they rea-
sonably assumed that the language of the Federal Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act was sufficient to discharge their duty to
warn consumers about the health risks of smoking. This is not a
persuasive argument either. The Act contained no language to sug-
gest that it preempted product liability actions or otherwise re-
lieved cigarette companies of their common law duty to warn.
Therefore, tobacco companies cannot claim detrimental reliance on
the statute as an excuse for not warning consumers about the
health risks of smoking.
2. Strict Liability as a Limit on Consumer Choice
Subjecting cigarette companies to strict liability may affect the
cost and availability of tobacco products and thereby restrict con-
388. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 235 (1973).
389. See, e.g., City of Hartford v. Associated Const. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 204, 384 A.2d
390 (Super. Ct., Hartford Co. 1978) (strict liability applied to franchise agreement); New-
mark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (strict liability applied to hybrid
transaction); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965) (strict liability applied to chattel lease); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207
A.2d 314 (1965) (strict liability applied to sale of tract house); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97
Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (product seller held liable for punitive damages).
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sumer choices. Arguably, this would conflict with a congressional
policy, expressed in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertis-
ing Act,390 of allowing consumers to choose whether or not to
smoke. Personal autonomy is an important value in a democratic
society. It includes the right to make decisions about life-style, po-
litical affiliation, religion, sexual behavior, and medical treat-
ment. 91 In a free market economy, freedom of choice also extends
to economic matters.3 92 Accordingly, consumers must be allowed to
select goods and services based on their own notions of personal
utility. This includes the right to purchase cigarettes.
In reality, consumers are rarely able to exercise complete dis-
cretion in a market environment. Instead, various factors often re-
strict free choice. For example, the government may prohibit the
sale or distribution of a particular product and thereby deny con-
sumers the right to obtain it. Even if a product is physically availa-
ble, cost constraints may prevent some persons from being able to
purchase it. Finally, consumers may be unable to make meaningful
market decisions because they are misled or denied essential infor-
mation by product sellers.
The imposition of strict liability on cigarette companies will
not significantly constrain consumer decisionmaking. Obviously,
strict liability is unlikely to affect the physical availability of ciga-
rettes. Unlike specific deterrence measures, strict liability allows
market forces to determine the price and availability of prod-
ucts. 93 Therefore, even if tobacco companies are subjected to strict
liability, they will still be free to sell cigarettes and consumers who
wish to smoke will still be able to do so.94
390. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982 & Supp. 1987); see also Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A
Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L. Rav. 678, 755-56 (1966) (prohibition of cigarette sales would
be undesirable).
391. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969) (possession of obscene material in home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (birth control); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (political affiliation); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (exposition of religious beliefs); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass.
417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (termination of medical treatment).
392. See generally R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
393. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 241, at 652.
394. The imposition of liability on cigarette manufacturers may affect the supply of
tobacco products on the market. Some firms may leave the market entirely; others may
reduce output in response to lower demand. If the market functions properly, however, the
physical supply will generally be sufficient to meet existing consumer demand. See generally
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Even though cigarettes may be physically available, imposition
of strict liability on tobacco companies may cause the price to in-
crease so substantially that many persons will no longer be able to
afford them. Arguably, their right to smoke will thereby be im-
paired. Cigarettes are a relatively inexpensive product. Therefore,
even if the price of cigarettes triples as a result of tort claims
against tobacco companies, consumers can still choose to smoke.
To be sure, some consumers will be forced to forego other activities
if they desire to continue smoking. It is difficult to see, however,
that the consumers' right to smoke is impaired if they are forced to
make such choices.3 95
Furthermore, while imposing strict liability on cigarette manu-
facturers may marginally restrict freedom of choice for poorer con-
sumers, it will make such choices much more meaningful for con-
sumers generally by encouraging tobacco companies to provide
more information about their products. Warnings, of course, rein-
force personal autonomy by allowing consumers to make intelligent
choices about smoking.396 If strict liability claims based on failure
to warn are allowed, cigarette companies are likely to provide con-
sumers with more information about the health risks of smoking.
Consequently, the principle of free choice will be promoted, not
undermined, if cigarette companies are subjected to strict liability
for failure to warn.
3. Responsibility of Victims for Their Decision to Smoke
There is considerable support for the proposition that people
should not be compensated for self-inflicted injuries. 97 Therefore,
cigarette manufacturers may argue that smokers should not re-
cover for their injuries either because they were themselves equally
culpable or because they were aware of the dangers of smoking and
voluntarily consented to assume these risks when they decided to
smoke.
The first argument is based on the notion that smokers are
id. at 652-58.
395. Tort liability may be undesirable if it causes the cost of essential products such as
prescription drugs to rise to a level where the poor cannot afford them. See Note, (The
Liability), supra note 61, at 758, n.190. No one, however, would suggest that cigarettes are
essential products. See id.
396. See Note, supra note 18, at 1057.
397. See Levin, supra note 34, at 244.
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guilty of culpable conduct and thus do not deserve to be compen-
sated. Fault, however, is not a collective attribute and it would be
unjust to deny recovery to smokers as a class merely because some
of them are at fault. Instead, decisions about consumer fault
should be made on an individual basis. The proper place to con-
sider consumer conduct is during the litigation process where to-
bacco companies, in appropriate circumstances, may raise such is-
sues as assumption of risk or. consumer fault.
Furthermore, even if one assumes that smokers as a class are
blameworthy, the conduct of the tobacco industry is infinitely
worse. For example, cigarette companies knew about the health
risks of smoking long before consumers, but did nothing to warn
them about these dangers. Instead, prior to 1965, they represented
to the public that smoking was safe. Even now, cigarette manufac-
turers deny that smoking is harmful and refuse to provide any
warning beyond the statutory minimum. In addition, cigarette
companies sell a product that is not only harmful, but is addictive
as well. Instead of warning about the danger of nicotine addiction,
tobacco companies rely on it to sustain their market.398 Thus,
claims of consumer misconduct by cigarette manufacturers are not
likely to carry much weight.
The second argument is based on the principle "volenti non fit
injuria.'" It presupposes that consumers who freely consent to
encounter a risk cannot justifiably complain when that very risk
causes injury. Of course, assumptions about collective risk-taking
are almost as dubious as assumptions about collective misconduct.
Because it is proper, however, to imply consent based on conduct
in individual cases,4 00 perhaps one can extend the principle of im-
plied consent to collective behavior as well. Even so, tobacco com-
panies cannot make a convincing argument that smokers know-
ingly and voluntarily agreed to expose themselves to any of the
specific health risks of smoking.
To be legally effective, consent must be both informed and
398. See White, The Intentional Exploitation of Man's Known Weaknesses, 9 Hous. L.
REV. 889, 915 (1972).
399. "He who consents cannot receive an injury." H. BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL
MAXIMS (8th ed. 1882).
400. See O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266, 266 (1891) (standing
in line to be vaccinated constitutes consent to vaccination); see also W. PROSSER & W.P.
KEETON, LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 113-14 (1984).
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voluntary. Arguably, both of these elements are missing where
smokers are concerned. The general public did not become aware
of the health risks of smoking until the Surgeon General's Report
was published in 1964.401 Even now, the vast majority of consumers
do not know about many of the specific health risks of smoking.0 2
Warnings do little to inform consumers about such risks because
cigarette advertising dilutes their effectiveness. 40 3
There is also some doubt about whether smoking can be re-
garded as entirely voluntary. To be sure, smoking is a matter of
personal choice. While the decision to begin smoking may be vol-
untary, however, the addictive nature of tobacco causes many
smokers to continue smoking when they would rather stop.404 Nic-
otine is extremely addictive; according to one commentator, it is
more addictive than heroin.0 5 Moreover, most smokers become de-
pendent on tobacco within a short time after beginning to
smoke.40 Because the health effects of smoking result from long-
term exposure to tobacco products, one may argue that smokers,
once they are "hooked" on cigarettes, are no longer acting volunta-
rily when they continue to smoke. 0 7
The argument that injured consumers can make no moral
claim for compensation is not persuasive. Smokers as a class have
neither waived their right to recovery, nor have they forfeited it by
misconduct.
4. Economic Effects of Strict Liability on Third Parties
Another concern is the effect of economic dislocation on third
parties. As the experience of the asbestos industry demonstrated,
large numbers of products liability claims can bankrupt even large
companies. 40 8 When this occurs, innocent people also suffer: stock-
401. See Surgeon Gen. Rpt. 1964, supra note 42.
402. See Note, (Plaintiff's Conduct), supra note 16, at 813-14.
403. See Note, supra note 41, at 183.
404. Three out of four smokers have tried to quit and have failed. See Levin, supra
note 34, at 226, n.247.
405. See Marwick, Changing Climate Seen in Efforts to Tell Public About Smoking,
Health, 252 J. A-MA 2797, 2797 (1984).
406. See Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1433-34 (1980).
407. See White, supra note 398, at 915-916.
408. See Phillips, Asbestos Litigation: The Test of the Tort System, 36 ARu L. REV.
343 (1982); see also Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social and Political Issues
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holders lose their capital, workers may lose their jobs, and state
and local governments may lose tax revenues. e0 Even injured con-
sumers are affected because a company that goes bankrupt can no
longer pay tort claims.41 0
The tobacco industry may claim that it would be economically
crippled if cigarette companies were held liable for the health ef-
fects of smoking. Not only would cigarette manufacturers be af-
fected, but other businesses would feel the spillover effects of a
decline in the tobacco industry. Thus, a large number of people
who depend, directly or indirectly, upon the tobacco industry for
their livelihood, would be harmed if cigarette companies reduced
their operations.
Agriculture is one sector of the economy that obviously bene-
fits from the existence of a tobacco industry. Tobacco is an impor-
tant crop in many states and produces $3.4 billion per year for to-
bacco farmers.41' The stable market for tobacco and its high per
acre return compared with other crops makes it financially attrac-
tive for farmers to cultivate." 2 Although tobacco farmers could
grow other crops, many of them would suffer a drop in income if
the market for tobacco were to suddenly collapse. Moreover, this
economic hardship would not be limited to farmers. Tobacco farm-
ing is a labor-intensive enterprise which employs almost a million
persons either full-time or part-time.413 Many of these employees
would not be able to find comparable jobs elsewhere.1"
The tobacco manufacturing industry is among the five largest
industries in the United States415 and employs approximately 1.3
Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 573 (1983).
409. See Coffee, "No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 401-02 (1981).
410. See, e.g., Comment, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: Adding Uncer-
tainty to Injury, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 982, 1012 (1983); Note, (New Jersey), supra note 61,
at 685.
411. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 55, at 330. Tobacco is the number one cash crop in
three states. See Note, supra note 41, at 167 n.12.
412. See, e.g., W. FINGER, THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION (1981). The federal
tobacco price support system contributes to this market stability. See id.
413. See Tobacco's Economic Importance, reprinted in 124 CONG. REc. 15,554-56 (1978).
414. See id.
415. See Comment, (Judicial), supra note 55, at 332. The tobacco industry is responsi-
ble for about one percent of the nation's gross national product. See R. TOLLISON, SMOKING
AND SOCIETY (1986).
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million workers.41 It also contributes to the economic health of
such industries as banking, transportation, chemicals, paper, and
advertising.4 17 Although tobacco companies have diversified to es-
cape their dependence on the American tobacco market, most of
their profits still come from the sale of cigarettes and other tobacco
products. 18
The tobacco industry also pays substantial amounts in taxes
to federal, state and local governments. In 1983, for example, to-
bacco companies paid $8.02 billion in taxes to the federal govern-
ment and another $5.44 billion to state and local governments.419
In addition, all levels of government benefit from income and other
taxes paid by tobacco company employees.
It is appropriate to consider the effect that holding cigarette
companies liable will have on third parties. Certainly many persons
will suffer economic loss if the tobacco industry is crippled by mas-
sive liability to injured consumers. However, even if this fear is
fully justified, it would still be unfair to completely deny compen-
sation to injured consumers. Unfortunately, preemption has this
very effect. Therefore, the courts should not invoke the preemption
doctrine merely to protect the tobacco industry from a possible
wipeout.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO TORT LITIGATION
This Article has concluded that there is no legal basis for ap-
plying the preemption doctrine to cigarette warning cases. Not
only is the preemption doctrine inappropriate from a doctrinal
point of view, but public policy strongly supports imposing liability
on the tobacco industry for the health effects of smoking. Why
then have so many courts allowed these claims to be preempted?
One possibility is that courts are fearful the tobacco industry
would suffer the same fate as the asbestos industry if it is sub-
jected to strict liability. The underlying concerns are twofold: first,
if tobacco companies are bankrupted by massive tort liability they
would be unable to compensate injured parties; second, if the costs
of tort litigation are too high they would consume the lion's share
416. See 124 CoNG. REC. 15,556 (1978).
417. See Comment, (Judicial), supra note 55, at 332.
418. See id.
419. See R. TOLLISON, supra note 415. Taxes on cigarette products amount to twenty-
five to fifty-five percent of their retail price. See id. at 285.
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of the economic resources available for compensation.
If courts share these concerns about the effect of tort liability
on cigarette companies, then the preemption doctrine may be
nothing more than a convenient tool for shielding the tobacco in-
dustry from excessive liability. Even if these concerns are valid,
however, the preemption doctrine should not be applied in ciga-
rette warning cases because it denies compensation to most injured
consumers and because it relieves cigarette companies of their duty
to warn.
One solution is to revise the current cigarette labeling act. The
present congressionally dictated warning should be replaced by one
that is composed by a Federal administrative agency such as the
Federal Trade Commission. The agency should be authorized to
update this warning periodically so that it presents consumers with
current information about smoking-related risks. The statute may
then expressly preempt failure to warn claims based on these
warnings. Claims based on the inadequacy of past warnings, how-
ever, should be allowed.
With respect to these claims, an effort should be made to
streamline the litigation process in order to reduce costs or, if nec-
essary, to develop an alternative compensation mechanism that
would be cheaper and more equitable than tort liability. This, of
course, could not be done by the courts alone, but would require
legislative involvement as well.
This portion of the Article will consider whether cigarette liti-
gation would be excessively costly and whether the litigation pro-
cess can be reformed in order to reduce costs. Finally, some alter-
native compensation schemes will be briefly evaluated.
A. Suits Against Cigarette Companies as Mass Tort Litigation
In the past decade, the makers of asbestos,2 0 Agent Orange,""1
420. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986); Wil-
son v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Co., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). Asbestos, a silicate fiber
product used as insulation material, causes asbestosis, mesothelioma and bronchogenic car-
cinoma. See Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 55, 58, 74 (1978). Asbestosis is a pulmonary fibrosis or increase in the fibrous tissue in
the lungs; it is often fatal. See Note, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871,
873-74 (1983). Malignant mesothelioma is a tumor arising from the body's mesothelial cells;
it is invariably fatal. See Mansfield, Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15
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DES, 422 the Dalkon Shield IUD,42 3 and other goods424 have been
sued by numerous parties who have been injured because of ge-
neric defects in their products. Suits against cigarette companies
FORUM 860, 863-64 (1980). Exposure to asbestos may also cause bronchogenic carcinoma
(lung cancer), particularly among workers who smoke. See Ingram, Insurance Coverage
Problems in Latent Disease and Injury Cases, 12 ENVTL. L. 317, 320-21 (1982).
Since the Second World War, eleven million workers have been exposed to sufficient
levels of asbestos and between 8500 and 67,000 of them will die each year from asbestos-
related diseases. See Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REv. 429, 430
(1986). As many as 2.1 million persons will eventually die from asbestos exposure. See Com-
ment, supra. As of 1982, more than 20,000 cases were pending against Johns-Manville Corp.
and 500 additional suits were being filed each month. See Phillips, supra note 408, at 343.
Estimates of total liability for asbestos-related injuries range from $40 billion to $100 bil-
lion. See Comment, An Examination of Recurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 46 ALB. L.
REy. 1307, 1349 n.197 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, (Recurring Issues)].
421. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.
1980), modified, 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Agent Orange, a dioxin herbicide, was used
extensively in Vietnam. More than 2.4 million servicemen were exposed to Agent Orange
during the Vietnam War. Many of these servicemen brought suit against the manufacturer,
claiming to have suffered injuries as a result of exposure to Agent Orange. See Mullenix,
Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEx. L.
REV. 1039, 1042 n.14 (1986).
422. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984); Bichler v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982); Martin v. Abbott
Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d
166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
Between 500,000 and two million women used DES from the early 1950's through 1971
in order to prevent miscarriages. DES caused many of their female offspring to develop
vaginal cancer, cervical cancer and adenosis. See Note, Proof of Causation in Multiparty
Drug Litigation, 56 Tax. L. REV. 125, 125 (1977). As of 1982, about 1000 "DES daughters"
had filed suit against the drug's manufacturers. See Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort
Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713, 718-19 (1982).
423. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984); MacMillen v. A.H.
Robins Co., 217 Neb. 338, 348 N.W.2d 869 (1984); Lindsey v. A.H. Robins Co., 91 A.D.2d
150, 458 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2d Dep't), aff'd sub nom., Martin v. Edwards Laboratories, 60
N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983); Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 Wis.
2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983). Approximately 2.2 million women used the Dalkon Shield,
an intrauterine birth control device, between 1970 and 1974. Many women suffered serious
injuries as a result of uterine infection from the IUD. Eventually, more than 13,000 users
filed suit against the manufacturer and it was forced to declare bankruptcy. See Rubin,
supra note 420, at 430-31.
424. These products include: tampons, see O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821
F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987); Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir.
1983); West v. Johnson & Johnson Prods. Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 381, 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985); DPT vaccine, see Wack v. Lederle Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 123 (N.D.
Ohio 1987); Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987); MacGillivray
v. Lederle Laboratories, 667 F. Supp. 743 (D.N.M. 1987); and Bendectin, see In re "Bendec-
tin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 1448 (J.P.M.D.L. 1984); Albertson v. Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc., 441 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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are likely to resemble the above examples of mass tort litigation.42 5
This raises legitimate concerns about whether cigarette companies
have the ability to fully compensate injured consumers and
whether tort litigation is a cost-effective means of compensating
victims.
1. Massive Liability
Mass tort litigation has led to mass tort liability for some
manufacturers. In some cases, product manufacturers have been
forced to declare bankruptcy in order to obtain a respite from ex-
isting judgments and future tort liability.416 Furthermore, the pros-
pects for massive liability are enhanced by the increasing willing-
ness of juries to award punitive damages in mass tort cases. 27
The effect of massive liability on the tobacco industry's ability
to loss spread was discussed in Part IV.428 At that time, the Author
concluded that fear of such liability did not justify preempting tort
suits against cigarette companies because this would deprive in-
jured consumers of all compensation. Nevertheless, if tobacco com-
panies are indeed subjected to massive liability in the future, it
may be necessary to develop alternative compensation systems to
ensure that all injured parties are treated fairly.429
425. A mass tort involves multiple occurrences of various related harms over time. See
Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
475, 477 (1984); see also Note, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1615, 1617-20
(1972).
426. See Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Proceedings, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1121 (1983). Asbestos manufacturers Johns-Manville
Co., UNR Industries and Amatex Corporation all declared bankruptcy in 1982 in order to
protect themselves against tort liability. See id.; see also Note, Mass Tort Claims and the
Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Versus
the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEx. L. REv. 1297, 1300 (1982-83). A.H. Robins, the man-
ufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, also sought bankruptcy protection. See Rubin, supra note
420, at 430-31.
427. See Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 38 (1985-86).
428. See supra notes 315-45 and accompanying text.
429. Concern about massive liability is particularly justified if claimants recover puni-
tive, as well as compensatory damages against cigarette companies. This is a real possibility
if juries find that tobacco companies acted in bad faith by denying the existence of a link
between smoking and cancer or suppressing information about the health risks of smoking.
See Levin, supra note 34, at 223 (denial that smoking is unhealthy invites punitive
damages).
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2. High Transaction Costs
In addition, mass tort cases inevitably generate high transac-
tion (litigation) costs. 30 This is due in part from the large number
of claimants and the complex issues of causation that are involved
in such litigation. The existence of a large number of claimants
discourages settlements and forces manufacturers to stubbornly
litigate each case. The defendant's conduct toward one plaintiff in
a mass tort case inevitably affects the behavior of other claimants
toward the defendant. For example, a manufacturer who loses a
case to one claimant will find that other claimants have hardened
their positions in the expectation that they will win too. Even set-
tlement with one party is likely to set a floor for negotiations with
other claimants if the settlement terms become known.
Transaction costs are also higher when more than one defend-
ant is involved. 431 The presence of multiple defendants complicates
settlement negotiations and increases the cost of litigation if a trial
becomes necessary. In addition, tort claims of this nature often
generate secondary litigation between defendants and their insur-
ance companies and among the carriers themselves.3 2
Causation issues also make the litigation process more costly.
There are two aspects to this problem. The first is establishing the
identity of the person or entity responsible for the plaintiff's in-
jury. The generic character of some products, the inconspicuous-
ness of the exposure event, and the long latency period involved in
many injuries often make it difficult to identify the responsible
430. According to a 1977 United States Insurance Service Office Survey, insurance com-
panies spent an average of forty-two cents in defense costs for each dollar paid to claimants.
See Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Product Liability Act Re-
port, S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984). In addition, plaintiffs typically paid
litigation expenses plus thirty-three percent of the recovery as a contingent fee. Thus, the
private costs of litigation are more than twice the net recovery for a successful claimant. See
Rubin, supra note 420, at 434. Transaction costs are particularly high in asbestos cases:
eighty to ninety cents of every dollar spent in such cases went to pay litigation expenses,
while only ten to twenty cents went to compensate victims. See Note, supra note 420, at
903, n.192.
431. In many mass tort cases, injuries are often caused by exposure to more than one
source. Therefore, injured parties must sue several defendants. Even if the plaintiff brings
suit against a single producer, the defendant would probably implead other parties. Thus,
claimants who smoked several brands of cigarettes would have to sue more than one ciga-
rette manufacturer. See id. at 889-90.
432. See Mansfield, supra note 420, at 874-79; See Note, Adjudicating Asbestos Insur-
ance Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HARv. L. REv. 739, 740-41 (1984).
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party.43 The second aspect of this problem is determining the ori-
gin of the victim's injury or disease. Many diseases do not have a
single cause, but result from the complex interaction of various
factors. 3 4
Often causal connections between particular activities and dis-
ease are based solely on epidemiological statistics. These statistics,
however, can only attribute a portion of the disease incidence in
the general population to a potential source; given the current
state of knowledge about the etiology of many diseases and the
generality of most statistical data, it is usually impossible to deter-
mine the cause of such a disease in a specific individual. 435 For this
reason, claimants can rarely establish proof of causation based on
general statistical data alone.36
Litigation against cigarette companies is likely to have the
high transaction costs associated with other types of mass tort liti-
gation. For one thing, cigarette companies have a history of tena-
ciously defending themselves against prospective tort liability.437 In
addition, the number of potential claimants is extremely large. An
estimated 350,000 Americans die each year because of smoking.43 8
If only a small percentage of them sought recovery, the tobacco
industry would face thousands of lawsuits each year. Of course, the
number of claimants would diminish rapidly if the cigarette com-
panies won most of the early cases; on the other hand, as the expe-
433. See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851, 856 (1984).
434. See Prince, Compensation for Victims of Hazardous Substance Exposure, 11 Wm.
MITCHELL L. REV. 657, 688 (1985).
435. See Rosenberg, supra note 433, at 856-57.
436. Under the traditional standards of proof, the plaintiff must establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant's conduct caused his injury. Acceptance of statis-
tical data for this purpose varies, however. Under the "strong preponderance" approach, the
plaintiff cannot prove causation by statistical evidence alone; some additional evidentiary
linkage is required. See Seltzer, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal
for Tort Reform, 10 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 797, 821-22 (1983); Trauberman, Statutory
Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific and Economic Burdens on the Chemi-
cal Victim, 7 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 177, 198 (1983). Under the "weak preponderance" rule,
the plaintiff may recover upon a statistical showing that causation exists even if there is no
direct evidence linking the plaintiff or his injuries to the defendant or its product. See Sher-
man, Agent Orange and the Problem of the Indeterminate Plaintiff, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV.
369, 384 (1986).
437. See Comment, Strict Products Liability on the Move: Cigarette Manufacturers
May Soon Feel the Heat, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1137, 1143 (1986) (tobacco companies have
never lost or settled a case involving smoking-related illness).
438. See Levin, supra note 34, at 198.
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rience of the asbestos industry has indicated, the number of claim-
ants will quickly snowball if most of the initial claimants succeed
in recovering against product manufacturers.
Although brand loyalty is strong among smokers, many of
them may have smoked a number of brands over their lifetimes. 3 9
Thus, a good number of cases will involve more than one defend-
ant. Even if defendant cigarette companies cooperate in their de-
fense of a suit, the cost of litigation will undoubtedly be increased
by the presence of multiple defendants.
Causation issues will also complicate litigation against ciga-
rette companies. Although cigarette companies dispute the fact
that smoking causes lung cancer, the medical evidence is so over-
whelming that plaintiffs should be able to prove causation in such
cases.440 Causation issues, however, are likely to be more sophisti-
cated in cases where victims seek recovery for heart disease, lung
disease, or cancer of other organs besides lungs. Smoking also con-
tributes to heart disease, chronic obstructive lung disease and
other types of cancer. It is not the sole cause of these diseases.44'
For this reason, plaintiffs and defendants alike will be required to
seek expert advice to deal with these complex causation questions.
This, in turn, will increase the cost of litigation for both parties.
439. There are six major producers of tobacco products in the United States. They are
R.J. Reynolds Industries, Liggett & Meyers Co., American Brands, Lorillard Co., Brown &
Williamson Industries, and Phillip Morris. See Comment, (Judicial), supra note 55, at 332
n.92; see also R. MILES, COFFIN NAILS AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES 32-33 (1982).
440. Cigarette smoking is estimated to cause about ninety-five percent of all lung can-
cer. See Levin, supra note 34, at 199.
441. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, The Health Consequences of
Smoking: Cardiovascular Disease-A Report of the Surgeon General iii-iv (1983). Accord-
ing to the Surgeon General, smoking is responsible for about thirty percent of the fatal
heart attacks. This presumably means that most fatal heart attacks are not caused by smok-
ing. On the other hand, smoking is a major contributor to chronic obstructive lung disease.
See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, The Health Consequences of Smoking:
Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease-A Report of the Surgeon General vii (1984). Smoking
contributes to between seventy and eighty percent of all emphysema and chronic bronchitis
deaths each year. See Holbrook, Tobacco Smoking, in HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 940 (K. Isselbacher 9th ed. 1980). The link between smoking and other forms of
cancer is more attenuated. In addition to smoking, diet and other factors contribute to can-
cer. See Levin, supra note 34, at 199 n.32. Therefore, smokers who contract cancer, other
than lung cancer, may have difficulty holding cigarette companies responsible for their
injuries.
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B. Reforming the Tort Litigation Process
Commentators have suggested various ways to streamline the
litigation process and thereby reduce transaction costs in mass tort
cases. These proposals include consolidation, use of class actions
and offensive use of collateral estoppel.442 Unfortunately, so far
none of these reforms have been implemented effectively in mass
tort cases.
1. Consolidation
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a
court to consolidate several cases if they present a common ques-
tion of law or fact.4 ' The court may order consolidation of claims
for pretrial proceedings, for joint trial of common issues, or for
joint trial of all issues.444 Actions pending in different judicial dis-
tricts in the federal court system, however, cannot be immediately
consolidated under Rule 42. Consolidation is possible only if the
related cases are all filed in or transferred to a single federal dis-
trict court.446 The district court in which the action is originally
filed may transfer the case in its entirety to another district for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses or in the interest of jus-
tice.447 This approach has proven of little value in achieving the
consolidation of mass tort cases in a single venue, however, because
it requires the unanimous cooperation of all the transferor judges
to effect complete consolidation.448
In addition, separate federal cases may be consolidated for
pretrial proceedings by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litiga-
tion.449 The MDL Panel may order a transfer when (1) civil actions
442. In addition to these devices, commentators have also advocated such techniques as
summary jury trials as well as use of magistrates and special masters. See generally Note,
Affirmative Judicial Case Management: A Viable Solution to the Toxic Product Litigation
Crisis, 38 ME. L. REv. 339, 370-76 (1986).
443. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42; see also Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution
to a Complex Problem, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 467, 504-08 (1985).
444. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2382-83, at
257-59 (1972).
445. See Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1962).
446. See Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
779, 802 (1985).
447. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1982).
448. See Trangsrud, supra note 446, at 802-03.
449. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in
different districts, (2) the transfer will promote the just and effi-
cient conduct of individual suits, and (3) the transfer will be for
the convenience of parties and witnesses. 450 The MDL Panel has
approved consolidation in a number of product liability cases.45
Consolidation is permitted, however, only for pretrial preparation
and the cases must then be returned to the courts from which they
were transferred." 2 Therefore, this form of consolidation does not
address the problems presented by mass tort litigation. 53
2. Class Actions
Many commentators have advocated the use of class actions in
mass tort cases. 414 In a class action, one or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all mem-
bers of the group. 55 In order to qualify for certification as a class
action in federal court, a dispute must meet the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). These include numerosity of
450. See Trangsrud, supra note 446, at 803.
451. See, e.g., In re Cutter Labs, Inc. "Braunwald-Cutter" Aortic Heart Valve Prods.
Liab. Litig., 465 F. Supp. 1295 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979) (prosthetic heart valve); In re Multi-Piece
Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 464 F. Supp. 969 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979) (truck wheels); In re Swine Flu
Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 446 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978) (vaccination); In re
Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Drug "Cleocin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 450 F. Supp. 1168 (J.P.M.D.L.
1978) (antibiotic drug); In re Celotex Corp. "Technifoam" Prods. Liab. Litig., 68 F.R.D. 502
(J.P.M.L. 1975) (plastic insulation); In re A.H. Robins Co. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 540 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975) (intrauterine devices); In re Aviation Prods.
Liab. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 1401 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972) (commercial helicopter engines). The
MDL Panel, however, has refused to transfer actions to a common venue when there are
questions of fact unique to each case or where the actions are far advanced. See In re Asbes-
tos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906, 910 (J.P.M.D.L.
1977).
452. See Rubin, supra note 420, at 433. Some commentators believe that 28 U.S.C. §
1407 also authorizes the MDL Panel to transfer cases for trial. See Weigel, The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts, and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D.
575, 581 (1978). But see Trangsrud, supra note 446, at 809.
453. See Note, Mechanical and Constitutional Problems in Certification of Mandatory
Multistate Tort Class Actions Under Rule 23, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 517, 568 (1983).
454. See Comment, Federal Mass Tort Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency,
47 ALB. L. REv. 1180, 1227 (1983); Note, Class Actions and Mass Toxic Torts, 8 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 269, 285-89 (1982); Note, Class Actions in a Products Liability Context: The
Predomination Requirement and Cause-in-Fact, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 859, 860 (1979); Note,
The Products Liability Class Suit: Preventive Relief for the Consumer, 27 S.C.L. REv. 229,
248-49 (1975) [hereinafter Note, (Products Liability)]; Mullenix, Class Resolution of the
Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 Thx. L. REv. 1039, 1045 (1986).
455. See Note, (Products Liability), supra note 454, at 253.
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class members, 56 commonality of legal and factual questions,57
typicality of claims or defenses of the class representative,' 8 and
adequacy of representation.4' 9 These requirements can usually be
satisfied in mass tort cases.6 0
If these conditions are satisfied, the controversy must also fall
within one of the categories of class action specified in Rule
23(b). 461 This presents more of a problem. The two most promising
categories are "limited fund" and "common question" actions.'62
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) protects litigants when recovery by some plaintiffs
impairs others' chances, as when the defendant possesses limited
resources for the satisfaction of claims.' 63 This form of class action
is mandatory in the sense that all members of the class are bound
by the outcome of the suit.4 4 The courts, however, have been re-
luctant to certify many products liability cases as limited fund
class actions.'65 One reason is that applicants have been required
to establish a "reasonable likelihood" that the plaintiffs' claims
will exceed the defendant's available assets.'6 6 This standard limits
the availability of limited fund class actions in such cases. 67
Rule 23(b)(3) allows class certification in cases where common
questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues as long
456. Numerosity requires that the class must be so numerous that conventional joinder
is impracticable. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 387 (D. Mass. 1979).
457. Commonality requires the presence of questions of law or fact common to the
class. See Note, The Punitive Damage Class Action: A Solution to the Problem of Multiple
Punishment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 153, 166.
458. Typicality requires that the class claims be similar, though not necessarily identi-
cal, to the claims of the representative party. See Note, supra note 453, at 524.
459. Adequacy of representation requires that the class be represented by a party with
a significant interest in the outcome. The class must be represented by competent counsel,
and there must not be any conflicting or antagonistic interests between class members. See
Note, supra note 457, at 167.
460. See Trangsrud, supra note 446, at 787-88.
461. See Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems
of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 66 (1983).
462. See id. at 66-67.
463. See Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1787, 1800 (1983).
464. See Seltzer, supra note 461, at 66.
465. See In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984); In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). But see In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig.,
100 F.R.D. 718, 723-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (class certified for purposes of punitive damages
claim).
466. See Bendectin Prods., 749 F.2d at 306.
467. See Trangsrud, supra note 446, at 801.
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as a class action is the superior method of handling the litiga-
tion.488 Common question class actions are not mandatory and po-
tential class members may opt out if they wish.46 9 Common ques-
tion class actions have not been used frequently in mass tort
litigation, primarily because courts often conclude that common
questions do not predominate.470
3. Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel
It has been suggested that offensive use of collateral estoppel
will help to simplify mass tort litigation. 1 Collateral estoppel pre-
cludes a party from relitigating previously decided facts or is-
sues.472 Normally, collateral estoppel is invoked by defendants, but
increasingly plaintiffs have attempted to use it in order to avoid
the expense of proving certain issues time and time again. In such
cases, the doctrine is called offensive collateral estoppel.473
In order to invoke offensive collateral estoppel based on a
finding or decision in a previous action, the plaintiff must show
that: (1) the defendant was a party or was in privity with a party
to the previous action, (2) the defendant or its privy had a full
opportunity to litigate the matter at issue, and (3) the questions
involved are identical. 74 In mass tort cases, the courts have often
468. See Note, Diethylstilbestrol: Extension of Federal Class Action Procedures to Ge-
neric Drug Litigation, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 461, 480, 484 (1980).
469. See Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96
HARv. L. REV. 1143, 1152-53 (1983).
470. See, e.g., Sanders v. Tailored Chem. Corp., 570 F. Supp. 1543 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(class certification denied for persons exposed to urea formaldehyde foam insulation because
common questions did not predominate); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 93 F.R.D. 875
(D.S.D. 1979) (class certification denied to DES victims because common questions did not
predominate); Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (class certification
denied to asbestos plant employees because common questions did not predominate); Ro-
senfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63 A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196, 201 (2d Dep't), appeal dis-
missed, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978) (class certification for
Dalkon Shield users denied because common questions did not predominate). But see In re
Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 100 F.R.D.
718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
471. See Note, Applying Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Asbestos Cases: A Viable
Alternative, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 687, 720 (1982) (collateral estoppel useful in asbestos
litigation).
472. See Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise:
An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L. REV. 141, 147 (1984).
473. See id.
474. Comment, (Recurring Issues), supra note 420, at 1331.
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refused to allow plaintiffs to use offensive collateral estoppel be-
cause the issues adjudicated in previous actions were not identical
to the those involved in the case at hand.4 75 In addition, attempts
to invoke offensive collateral estoppel in mass tort cases have often
failed because of the existence of inconsistent verdicts. 47
Thus, it appears that use of offensive collateral estoppel is not
likely to facilitate the management of mass tort litigation.4 " This
is especially true in the case of cigarette litigation where the ade-
quacy of a warning is at issue. This is because the question of
whether a warning was inadequate or not will often depend on
such unique circumstances as the particular plaintiff's actual
knowledge of the danger.478
C. Alternative Compensation Plans
Although streamlining the litigation process may reduce trans-
action costs somewhat, the techniques discussed above have not
yet been successfully adapted to mass tort litigation. Moreover,
even if transaction costs can be substantially lowered, the eco-
nomic cost of fully compensating injured consumers may still be
more than the tobacco industry can afford. For this reason, it may
be necessary to consider alternatives to conventional tort litigation.
Over the years legal scholars have put forth a number of pro-
posals to "reform" the tort system.479 Regardless of how such a
475. See Trangsrud, supra note 446, at 813. This is a particular problem when the issue
involved is whether or not the product was defective. Since the definition of defect varies, it
is unfair to preclude the defendant from relitigating this issue based on a finding of defect
in another state. See Ehrlenbach, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and Products Liability:
Reasoning with the Unreasonable, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 19, 28 (1982).
476. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 346-47 (5th Cir.
1982) (inconsistent verdicts in previous asbestos cases); Erbeck v. United States, 533 F.
Supp. 444, 447 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (inconsistent verdicts in swine flu litigation).
477. See Gunn, The Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel in Mass Tort Cases, 52 Miss.
L.J. 765, 782-99 (1982); see also Green, supra note 472, at 224-26; Schwartz & Mahshigian,
Offensive Collateral Estoppel: It Will Not Work in Product Liability, 31 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REV. 583, 584 (1986).
478. See Weinberger, Collateral Estoppel and the Mass Produced Product: A Propo-
sal, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 38 (1979).
479. See generally J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY-No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation
and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967); O'Connell, Alternatives to the
Tort System for Personal Injury, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 17 (1986); O'Connell, A Proposal to
Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants'
Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333 [hereinafter O'Connell, (A Proposal)]; Pierce, En-
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plan is packaged, however, it must address at least four problems:
(1) scope of compensation, (2) level of compensation, (3) standard
required for proof of injury, and (4) source of compensation.
The first element is concerned with defining the boundaries of
the compensation system. A plan to compensate persons injured by
smoking, for example, may confine itself to diseases, like lung can-
cer, that are undeniably linked to smoking or it may cover other
illnesses as well. The narrower the plan's coverage, the lower its
costs will be.48 0
Most tort reform proposals achieve cost savings over litigation
by limiting the scope of recovery.48' Thus, compensation may be
limited to direct economic losses such as out-of-pocket medical
costs, lost earnings, and perhaps attorney's fees. Often these plans
require claimants to forego compensation for pain and suffering. 82
A plan which limited compensation for smoking-related injuries to
economic losses would cost far less than one that allowed compen-
sation for pain and suffering.4 3 Such costs would also be much eas-
ier to predict by statistical methods than intangible costs would be.
The compensation scheme's requirements for proof of injury
will have a direct impact on the level of transaction costs. If the
requirements for establishing causation were kept at a fairly low
threshold, transaction costs could be minimized. Further savings
could be realized over litigation if an informal and nonadversarial
hearing process was utilized.84
The final question is where does the money come from? As
mentioned earlier, those who benefit from an activity should bear
most of its costs. Therefore, smoking-related injuries should be
borne directly or indirectly by smokers rather than the general
public. This could be accomplished in several ways. One approach
would be for cigarette companies to establish a compensation fund
couraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV.
1281 (1980); Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF L. REv. 555 (1985).
480. Narrower coverage may also lessen transaction costs by excluding claims that are
difficult and costly to prove. See generally, Franklin, supra note 479, at 806-08.
481. See Franklin, supra note 479, at 799-800.
482. See O'Connell, (A Proposal), supra note 479, at 333.
483. One can justify less than full compensation for injured parties on two grounds.
First, claimants save litigation expenses and attorney's fees; second, it is appropriate to
award less than full compensation for "self-inflicted" injuries.
484. The decisionmaker could relax evidentiary rules and also adopt a liberal attitude
about the acceptability of statistical data to establish specific causation.
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which would pay claims to injured consumers.48 5 Each year the
compensation fund could levy assessments on cigarette companies
on a market share basis sufficient to reimburse it for the previous
year's claims. Tobacco companies would pass this cost on to con-
sumers by raising the price of cigarettes.
Another approach might resemble the "Superfund" model.48
Under this approach, the compensation fund, administered by a
government agency, could be financed by excise taxes levied on the
manufacture of tobacco products and earmarked for this purpose.
It would be best if this proposal were implemented at the federal
level, but it could also be used by individual states.
The compensation plan outlined above is necessarily sketchy.
Nevertheless, with suitable refinements, such a scheme might be
superior to litigation as a means of determining liability for smok-
ing-related injuries. It would provide some compensation for in-
jured parties; it would place at least part of the health costs of
smoking on cigarette companies and smokers; it would protect the
tobacco industry against economically crippling tort liability; and
it would avoid some of the transaction costs associated with deter-
mining liability in an adversarial process.
CONCLUSION
Although a number of federal courts have upheld the preemp-
tion of failure to warn claims against cigarette manufacturers, the
United States Supreme Court will probably make the final decision
on this issue. Congress, nevertheless, is free to modify the preemp-
tive language of § 1334 of the Act and expressly preserve common
law tort actions. While public attention is now focused on preemp-
tion, the real question is the capacity of products liability litiga-
tion, as it currently functions, to provide fair compensation to in-
jured parties without destroying the economic well-being of
product manufacturers. The tort system seems to have failed to
485. The fund could operate as an independent entity or it could be administered by
insurance companies.
486. The Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (Superfund) was established by
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. 1987). The fund compensates those who are injured
by abandoned hazardous waste sites. See id. It is financed by government appropriations,
fees from private industry and fines collected under the liability and penalty provisions of
the Act. See id. § 9631.
970 [Vol. 39:897
19881 Preemption and Cigarette Warnings 971
resolve asbestos claims efficiently and it may fail again if cigarette
companies are subjected to comparable liability. If this should oc-
cur, some sort of legislative solution will be necessary.
